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Chapter 1: Small Donors and Campaign Finance in Federal Elections 
 
The election of 2020 was the most expensive federal election cycle in U.S. history, taking 
a trend of gradual increases in spending in presidential cycles and blowing it out of the water 
with a greater than 100% increase over spending in 2016.1 Unsurprisingly, eight of the ten most 
expensive Senate races in U.S. history also occurred in 2020, with spending data as of mid-
October.2 Money flooded the system, and 2020 marked a continuing change in the makeup of the 
donor population, as 22% of total money raised through September came from small donations, 
including $1.7 billion given to Democrats and $1 billion to Republicans, up from 15% in 2016.3 
Small donations are generally defined as aggregate contributions of under $200 (to a 
single candidate), at which point a donor’s information has to be disclosed to the FEC.4 Those 
aggregate contributions below $200 are thus unitemized (i.e. unreported at the donor level) by 
candidates, and can be referred to using that term, while contributions above $200 are itemized 
contributions. As more donors reach an aggregate total of over $200 as the election cycle draws 
to a close, their money no longer counts as small donations, and causes estimates of small 
donation totals (As a share of all contributions) to change (on the other hand, newer donors may 
contribute at the end of the campaign). This surge in small donations was very evident in 
expensive Senate races,5 and may have important implications for the future of Congressional 
 




4 Disclosure laws use a sum of an individual’s contributions, so someone who donates $1 to the same candidate 201 
times is not a small donor. 
5 As of October 2020, the six candidates with the most raised from small donors were, in order: Jaime Harrison, 
Amy McGrath, Mark Kelly, Lindsey Graham, Sara Gideon, and Marth McSally. Both Harrison and McGrath raised 
more than $50 million and 50% of their funds from small donors. 






fundraising: At the start of the 116th Congress (2019-2020), Democrats in the House introduced 
and passed a House Resolution (H.R. 1) that would match the first $200 contributed by an 
individual to a specific candidate with six times as much money in public funds.6 The bill did not 
pass a Republican Senate. 
 This project looks at the role of small donations in American elections, focusing on the 
type of candidates who attract small donations and any connection between those donations and 
electoral success, measured using vote share. I will leverage the Database on Ideology, Money in 
Politics, and Elections (DIME) for information about candidates, such as party, district, gender, 
and incumbency status, as well as for its CFscore ideology measure (described below). In 
addition, I use information on fundraising and election results from the FEC, district partisanship 
information from the Cook Political Report, Facebook advertising statistics from the company’s 
ad archive, and Congressional district median income information from human rights activist 
Adam Isacson’s website. 
 CFscores are an ideology score based on clustering of individual contributors, with DW-
NOMINATE scores (which are a commonly used scaling of members of Congress based on roll-
call voting) serving as a base.7 Individual donors can be assigned ideology scores based on the 
known ideologies of candidates they donate to, then scores can be assigned for all candidates 
based on a weighted average of the scores of their contributors. CFscores are able to give scores 
to candidates who do not have a history of roll-call votes, and incorporate political donors’ views 
of candidate issue positions that rarely or never appear in votes. This means that candidates who 
 
6 Richard H. Pildes, “Participation and Polarization,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 22, 
no. 2 (2020): 348. 





have a more-bipartisan donor base will appear less extreme, while candidates whose donors are 
all party loyalists will appear more extreme, independent of votes. Still, a candidate who has 
more donor overlap with, say, Joe Manchin will likely have a more moderate score than a 
candidate with fewer common donors, even if all donors to those two candidates are Democrats. 
Ultimately, CFscores predict roll call votes at about a 92.8% accuracy rate, 1% better than party 
identification alone, and 1% worse than the DW-Nominate scores based off those votes.8 More 
information about CFscores is provided in the appendix to this chapter. 
 In this chapter, I plan on reviewing the issue of money in politics more generally, starting 
with an overview of how our current campaign finance system affects our politics and how 
Supreme Court jurisprudence brought it there. Next, I will cover motivations for contributing as 
a large or small donor, such as ideological agreement, party loyalty, or a desire for access or 
influence. Finally, I’ll introduce the question of whether fundraising or spending ultimately 
affects the outcome of elections. Chapter 2 further explores the motivations behind small 
donations, and examines the relationship between gender, candidate experience, district 
competitiveness, Facebook spending and small donations. Chapter 3 then examines how 
campaign finance affects election results, and includes linear models for the relationship between 
small donations, larger donations, comparative spending, and a candidate’s final vote share.  
Small donors have the potential to play an increasingly large role in the financing of 
political campaigns, and it is valuable to understand how these changes influence electoral 
outcomes. In the concluding chapter, I review the main findings and consider the main 
implications that I can draw from my analysis. These include the significant association between 
 
8 Adam Bonica, “Are Donation-Based Measures of Ideology Valid Predictors of Individual-Level Policy 




more-extreme CFscores and greater receipts of small donations, but worse general election 
performance than similar but more-moderate candidates. Small donations are also associated 
with lower candidate performance than large donations, but more broadly, candidates who 
outspend their opponent outperform when compared to the performance of their party’s 
presidential candidate in their district. Importantly, this advantage for spending disappears in the 
closest (and thus more high-profile) races. 
 
How Does Money Affect the Work of Congress? 
 A number of academics and legal scholars have bemoaned the importance of “big 
money” in politics, a sentiment that, while not prominent, appears to be shared by the American 
people. Richard Hasen has claimed that we have “a system in which economic inequalities, 
inevitable in a free market economy, are transformed into political inequalities that affect both 
electoral and legislative outcomes.”9 In Republic, Lost, Lawrence Lessig cites a post-Citizens 
United poll in which 70 percent of respondents agreed with a statement that Congressional 
representatives are “controlled” by the people, PACs, and interest groups who fund their 
campaigns.10 
Republican megadonor Sheldon Adelson (who died in early 2021) is one example of a 
bankroller who could be viewed as “controlling” specific candidates. Adelson heavily backed 
Newt Gingrich in the 2012 Republican Party, and political scientist Raymond La Raja argues he 
did so to “advertise his strong preference for policies that limited government regulations and 
 
9 Richard Hasen, Plutocrats United: Campaign Money, the Supreme Court, and the Distortion of American 
Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016): 15. 




supported Israel,” positions pushed by Gingrich’s campaign.11 Richard Hasen, meanwhile, 
describes how Chris Christie had a private meeting to apologize to Adelson for describing the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip as “occupied territories.”12 Gingrich did not win in 2012, nor Christie 
in 2016, but it’s clear Adelson held important sway in the politics of the Republican Party. Even 
if this is merely an appearance, it’s deeply concerning to advocacy groups like the Brennan 
Center for Justice, which argues “the reality, or even the perception, that campaign donors call 
the shots on major policy decisions is deeply corrosive to our democracy.”13 And whether or not 
the general public continues to believe the political process is corrupted by campaign cash, 
members of Congress have been frank about its negative effects. 
 Consider U.S. Rep.-turned MSNBC anchor Joe Scarborough, who claims that during the 
1990s, “across the spectrum, money changed votes;” or Eric Fingerhut of Ohio, who admitted 
“the completely frank and honest answer” about money is that it “has a serious and profound 
impact on not only the issues that are considered in Congress, but also on the outcome of those 
issues.”14 Much of this connection is likely connected to the work of lobbyists, who Leon Panetta 
has described as “indispensable to politicians” and “in the driver’s seat…they basically know 
that the members have nowhere else to turn for money.”15 Even when politicians do not consider 
the fundraising implications of taking a particular issue position, they often receive just one side 
of issues when meeting with lobbyists and top donors. As Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) states, 
 
11 Raymond J. La Raja and Brian F. Schaffner, “The Ideological Wellsprings of Campaign Money,” In Campaign 
Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2015): 48. 
12 Hasen, Plutocrats United, 11-12. 
13 Gareth Fowler and Daniel I. Weiner, “Understanding H.R. 1’s Public Financing Provisions,” Brennan Center for 
Justice (September 20, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Understanding%20HR1%20Public%20Financing.pdf: 2. 
14 Both from Lessig, Republic, Lost, 133. 




“you’re hearing a lot about problems that bankers have and not a lot of problems that people who 
work in the mill in Thomaston, Conn., have.”16 
 The other cause for this connection is politicians’ understanding that organizations may 
advocate in elections in favor of either them or their opponent based on their stance on particular 
issues. Bob Kerrey, a former Senator from Nebraska, has stated that you ask yourself “is 
Americans for Prosperity going to advertise against me in a primary, yes or no?” and “if I do 
something about” global warming, “I know the Koch brothers are going to run an ad against 
me.”17 It’s generally uncommon for incumbents to lose to well-funded primary challengers, but it 
sounds like Kerrey would not have risked it. 
 In their aptly-titled paper “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?” Stephen 
Ansolabehere, John De Figueiredo, and James Snyder disagree with assertions of damaging links 
between campaign cash and votes, despite theoretical “astronomically high rates of return” from 
favorable policies obtained through disbursements.18 In a survey of forty previous studies on 
PAC contributions,19 they note three-quarters of the studies found no significant connection or a 
negative connection, in which increased contributions led to less support for an issue.20 They also 
point out the results from a sample of 94 executives from 12 unidentified “large corporations,” in 
which the average executive donated 0.05 % of their income, hardly different from the 0.04 % 
share for all Americans.21 Instead, they argue for the view of contributions “as a form of 
 
16 Fowler and Weiner, “Understanding H.R. 1’s Public Financing Provisions,” 3. 
17 Hasen, Plutocrats United, 51-52 
18 Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. De Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder, “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. 
Politics?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 1 (2003): 111. 
19 Political Action Committees (PACs) collect individual contributions before contributing that money to candidates, 
and are often affiliated with corporations, industries, and labor unions. 
20 Ibid, 112-114 




consumption – or, in the language of politics, participation.”22 From that perspective, donors 
participate because of the social or emotional benefits of doing so, rather than for the potential 
financial implications. It’s an expensive form of consumption for many participants too – 0.06% 
of Americans give $200 or more in a federal election cycle, and those 0.06% account for 65% of 
all disclosed contributions originating from individuals.2324 
 And despite the apparent lack of connection between PAC activity and votes on desired 
policies, interest groups still participated in the elections studied by Ansolabehere et al. They 
suggest that groups might serve merely as a more effective conduit or another consumer, but also 
indicate that interest groups may look for “access, rather than policy directly” and “give a little” 
to “get a little.”25 Indeed, a lack of connection between money and roll call votes does not mean 
that politicians can’t “skew policies in ways preferred by individual donors.”26 Any study of this 
topic should also in theory cover cases in which candidates adopt positions in anticipation of 
future support. 
 Ultimately, the influence of lobbyists and campaign cash in Congress has more to do with 
providing direction to members of Congress who already support a particular stance than 
converting other members. As Richard Hasen notes, “Usually, the lobbyist’s role is to provide 
support and useful information for a position the legislator already holds. At other times, the 
issue of interest to the lobbyist (and her client) is one the legislator has no firm position or even 
knowledge about.”27 Hasen does note that lobbyists “often have a difficult time getting elected 
 
22 Ibid, 117 
23 La Raja and Schaffner, “The Ideological Wellsprings of Campaign Money,” 40. 
24 Shane Goldmacher, “Dozen Megadonors Gave $3.4 Billion, One in Every 13 Dollars, Since 2009,” New York 
Times, April 20, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/us/politics/megadonors-political-spending.html. 
25 Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo, and Snyder, “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?” 126-127. 
26 Lessig, Republic, Lost, 139. 




officials to take action,”28 though if the lobbyist is a conduit for information it should be much 
easier to work at the margins, pushing existing and popular bills in a desired direction. 
 Even if it is unclear whether money has an outcome on the content and passage of 
legislation, the constant need to fundraise is hamstringing the ability of Congress to legislate. 
Lessig notes that members of Congress spend anywhere from 30-70 precent of their time 
fundraising, which leaves them with less time to read increasingly-lengthy bills (something they 
rarely do) and attend committee meetings. Indeed, the annual number of committee meetings in 
the House was halved between the 1970s and 2010.29 Many members of Congress dislike the 
constant focus on fundraising, but only speak out following retirement.  
When announcing his retirement in 2016, New York Rep. Steve Israel stated “I don’t 
think I can spend another day in another call room making another call begging for money,” and 
estimated he spent almost 6,000 hours raising money across his eight terms30 (which, to his 
credit, is just an hour a day). Rodney Alexander, a Louisiana Representative, claimed that raising 
money is “the main business, and it’s 24 hours a day raising money…. It’s not fair for the 
member, not fair for constituency to have to be approached every day or two or week or two 
about campaign contributions.”31 Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez reinforces this point, Tweeting in 
January 2019 (just after entering office): “This week I learned some members spend as little as 5 
hours per WEEK in their office bc their fundraising commitments are so high.”32 In November of 
 
28 Hasen, Plutocrats United: 56. 
29 Lessig, Republic, Lost: 138-139. 
30 New York Times Editorial Board, “Beggars Banquet in Congress,” New York Times, January 7, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/opinion/beggars-banquet-in-congress.html. 
31 Andy Kroll, “Retiring GOP Congressman: Fundraising is the “Main Business” of Congress,” Mother Jones, 
August 8, 2013, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/08/retiring-rodney-alexander-congressman-
fundraising-congress/. 





that year, she Tweeted that “I haven’t picked up a phone once this year to dial for dollars”33 and 
“Since I don’t spend hours each day asking for money, I spend a lot more time legislating, 
studying, & preparing/sitting in hearings.”34 Even if some of these statements are exaggerated, 
it’s clear the current requirements of our financing system impose a tremendous burden on 
members of Congress. And, as Lessig puts it, “If you learned that teachers at a public elementary 
school that your kids attended were spending 30 percent of their time running bake sales to fund 
their salaries rather than teaching your kids how to read, you’d be rightfully upset, too.”35 
Campaign Finance at the Supreme Court 
 Recent efforts to “level the playing field” and decrease the emphasis on money in politics 
have tended to fail at the Supreme Court, due to the perspective that efforts to limit spending 
amount to restrictions on speech. Most of the current grounds for restricting spending come from 
the goal or standard of blocking “quid pro quo” corruption as established in the 1976 case 
Buckley v. Valeo.36 Buckley concerned the Federal Election Campaign Act’s “ceiling[s] on 
expenditures,” which advanced a government interest related to “suppressing communication,”37 
though the government argued the law regulated conduct rather than speech.38 In Buckley, Court 
equated the use of expenditures to political speech, and not merely conduct, with the statement 
that “virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the 
expenditure of money” and thus “a restriction on the amount of money a person or group can 
spend…necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues 
 
33 Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Twitter post, November 26, 2019, 8:02 p.m., 
https://twitter.com/AOC/status/1199493783685079040. 
34 Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Twitter post, November 26, 2019, 8:11 p.m., 
https://twitter.com/AOC/status/1199495812214120450. 
35 Lessig, Republic, Lost: 142. 
36 La Raja and Schaffner, “The Ideological Wellsprings of Campaign Money,” 39-40. 
37 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976): 17. 




discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”39 However, the 
Court over a decade after Buckley has also considered the “corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth…that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas” in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which upheld 
regulations on corporate independent expenditures. That was overturned in 2010 by Citizens 
United.40  
Citizens United outlined much of the Court’s current opinion on corruption, and describes 
Buckley as “limited to quid pro quo,” the financial form of which is called “the hallmark of 
corruption” and defined as “dollars for political favors.” The opinion then adds that “the 
appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our 
democracy.”41 The current Court has used Buckley to make it clear that as long as a campaign 
finance law cannot be judged as curtailing the direct exchange of money for policy, and 
presumably in that specific order, it will not be upheld, which makes any efforts to limit the 
current surge in campaign spending unlikely.  
Of course, as Richard Hasen notes, restricting the use of money could have “profoundly 
bad effects” such as “censoring political activity, entrenching incumbents over challengers, or 
giving special treatment to media corporations.”42 Furthermore, it is possible that lower 
contribution limits, efforts to reduce lobbyist bundling, and restrictions on outside spending 
would cause incumbents to spend more time fundraising, in races where the marginal dollar 
might be more important. 
 
39 Ibid, 19. 
40 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010): 660. 
41 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010): 359-360. 




Where Small Donors Come In 
 There is a second method of de-emphasizing “big money” in politics, and that is by 
magnifying the importance of “small” money: Small donations, i.e. any total below a certain size 
that raises concerns about a relationship with a candidate or member of Congress. Lessig divides 
campaign contributions into three “buckets:” the smaller gifts whose contributors are not 
individually tracked by the campaign, the larger contributions from “people or interests whose 
interests are fairly transparent,” and money channeled through lobbyists.43 If candidates are 
primarily interested in raising a minimum level of campaign cash, increasing the size of the first 
bucket would decrease the importance of the latter two, and it would make it easier for 
candidates to commit to not soliciting large donors and PACs for contributions. Furthermore, for 
any flaws there may be in pandering to a loyal base in the hopes of raising more from small 
donations, Lessig notes, “if there is pandering here to raise more cash, it is public pandering. It’s 
the kind the opponent can take advantage of. It is the part that feeds political debate.”44 
 Magnifying the impact of small donations would also cause individual contributions to be 
less top-heavy. In 2016, 15,810 individuals accounted for half of all contributions, down from 
73,926 in 200045 (perhaps due to the striking down of aggregate contribution limits46). Donors 
are also unrepresentative of the larger population – they are older, whiter, wealthier, and more 
likely to be male than the average American.47 They are also 6 to 9 percentage points more likely 
to vote in a general election.48 Whether or not the profile of the small donor is any more 
 
43 Lessig, Republic, Lost, 120. 
44 Lessig, Republic, Lost, 120. 
45 Pildes, “Participation and Polarization,” 358. 
46 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014): 188. 
47 La Raja and Schnaffer, “The Ideological Wellsprings of Campaign Money,” 44. 
48 Seth J. Hill and Gregory A. Huber, “Representativeness and Motivations of the Contemporary Donorate: Results 




representative of the broader population, donations at a lower level are much more egalitarian 
and accessible; $50 or $100 is still a significant expense for many Americans, but a bag of potato 
chips retails for at most a couple dollars, and Americans spent $6 billion on potato chips in 2012, 
almost enough to fund that year’s entire slate of federal campaigns.49 It would be odd to ask 
Americans to give up potato chips so they could fund campaigns, but if they did so, the majority 
of campaign cash could then come from donors. It’s unclear how such a change would impact 
candidate selections and election outcomes, but catering to donors and to voters may look more 
similar if financing power is distributed more evenly. 
Small Donors and Ideological Motivations 
 Small donations are not without their criticism, particularly because of the ideological 
profile of the individual donor base relative to the population as a whole. Raymond La Raja and 
Brian Schnaffer plotted histograms of the ideologies of registered voters and federal donors in 
the 2010 election cycle, and while the histogram of registered voters is bell-shaped, the 
distribution of donors is bimodal, towards the middles of the “liberal” and the “conservative” 
regions.50 La Raja and Schnaffer, who support a more party-oriented system of campaign 
finance, argue that in “candidate-centered” systems, candidates are “pulled towards the 
ideological poles” by those “purist outsiders with strong policy preferences.”51 
Though it makes sense for political parties, who are concerned with electoral success, to 
serve as a moderating force in politics, it should be noted that more-liberal Democrats give to 
their party (i.e. contributions directly to party committees) about as often as they give to 
 
49 Hasen, Plutocrats United, 42. 
50 La Raja and Schaffner, “The Ideological Wellsprings of Campaign Money,” 46. 
51 Raymond J. La Raja and Brian F. Schaffner. “Campaign Finance Laws, Purists, and Pragmatists: Who Benefits?” 





candidates, while moderate Democrats give to candidates at a higher rate than they give to the 
party.52 If more-liberal Democratic donors were interested in pushing or supporting an 
ideological agenda against the moderating desire of the party, we would expect to see the 
opposite relationship, which we do see from the Republican Party.53 In addition, La Raja and 
Schnaffer’s argument rests on the belief that donors look to support broader ideological 
preferences rather than ultra-specific policy objectives (like specific tariffs or subsidies) or a 
simple desire for access. While there appears to be no clear and direct relationship between 
campaign contributions and specific policy initiatives,54 there is some indication that individual 
donors do push candidates towards the poles. 
However, Seth Hill and Gregory Huber found that some of the ideological motivations 
that lead to making campaign contributions include perceptions of the opposing party, with 
Republicans more likely to donate in an election if they placed the Democratic Party as more 
extreme on a seven-point Likert Scale.55 A 2014 Pew survey found a similar result for 
Democrats, with those holding a “very unfavorable” view of the Republican Party almost twice 
as likely to contribute as those who hold a “mostly unfavorable view.”56 Meanwhile, after 
finding a low correlation between an individual contributor’s CFscore,57 a measure of ideology 
based on what candidates different individuals choose to contribute to, and their policy ideology 
(measured via CCES responses), Hill and Huber add that “within each party coalition, 
contributors’ policy ideology is only somewhat related to the ideology one would estimate based 
 
52 La Raja and Schaffner, “The Ideological Wellsprings of Campaign Money,” 50. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo, and Snyder, “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?” 112-114. 
55 Hill and Huber, “Representativeness and Motivations of the Contemporary Donorate: Results from Merged 
Survey and Administrative Records,” 18-21. 
56 Pildes, “Participation and Polarization,” 386. 
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upon the candidates to which they donate and the set of donations those candidates receive from 
other groups and individual donors.” Based on these results, they conclude that “potential donors 
appear to make the choice to contribute in light of the dynamics of two-party competition, and 
use their contributions as complements to participation in elections.”58 
 However, in a 2019 study of small donations in the 2006-2010 U.S. House election 
cycles, Tyler Culberson, Michael McDonald, and Suzanne Robbins found a strong relationship 
between ideology and small donations raised for incumbents, while controlling for race 
competitiveness, challenger quality, incumbent scandals, district demographics, and party.59 The 
most ideologically extreme incumbents raised $306,557 more than the most moderate 
incumbents,60 though ideology did not appear to affect small donations to challengers of 
incumbents or candidates running for open seats,61 which may be due to a lack of name 
recognition and “bona fides.” Michael Malbin has noted that in the 2012 election cycle, almost 
half of the incumbents who raised more than $250,000 from small donors were in the more 
ideologically extreme half of their party.62 Specific factors like race competitiveness can magnify 
a candidate’s profile and lead to more small donations, but Bonica has found that for all regular 
individual donors (of any amount), a candidate’s ideology is more important than the prospect of 
access or maximizing the electoral chances of a particular party.63 
Understanding the connection between small donors and candidate ideology helps us gain 
a greater picture of how different types of candidates raise campaign cash. Incumbents raised just 
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6.7% of their funds from small donors, compared to 21% for challengers,64 and are statistically 
much more likely to receive money from business groups: Over 75% of money from business 
groups goes to incumbents.65 Meanwhile, Adam Bonica found that only 48-55% of small 
donations go to election winners, vs. 80-90% of corporate PAC money.66 Business-related funds 
going to incumbents should not be a surprise, as Culberson et al. suggest that “materialistic 
donors may be especially attracted to incumbents for the access they provide to the policymaking 
process.”67 Similarly to businesses favoring winners and incumbents, most of the 30 wealthiest 
Americans have CFscores more moderate than the average ideology for either the Republican or 
Democratic Parties, with Charles Koch, George Soros, Sergey Brin, and Larry Page as the only 
exceptions.68 
Individuals with a desire for access and policy influence would have an incentive to 
contribute to politicians on both sides of the aisle, depending on who controls the keys in any 
given session, but there are clearly those with a larger political agenda as well. Even those 
looking for influence may have specific goals related to taxes, their business interests, or other 
preferences, which can be a negative influence on Congress, but they will still want to give to 
candidates who will win, and those candidates are usually more moderate. Small donors have no 
expectation of acquiring access, and should thus be more likely to contribute to candidates who 
agree with them ideologically. Since those donors are also more likely to be on the ends of the 
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political spectrum, it would make sense for the candidates they support for ideological reasons to 
be more ideologically extreme. 
President Trump’s campaign emails from the 2020 Presidential election can give an idea 
of what drives an individual to donate. Emails described recipients as “President Trump’s 
fiercest and most loyal defenders” and include appeals such as “The President wants to know 
who stood by his side when the Radical Left came after him…he’s requested a list of every 
Patriot who donates to this email in the NEXT HOUR. Will he see your name?”69 Within these 
two cuts from longer messages, there is a clear appeal to the donor as an essential member of the 
campaign who needs to help the candidate, and coded ideological language that plays on anger or 
other feelings the donor already holds. These messages don’t target undecideds or individuals not 
fully committed to a candidate, and feed off the partisanship that currently appears in the system. 
Other Motivations for Contributions 
 However, in 2018 and in 2020, we saw a number of House challengers garner attention 
not because of their ideological positions but because they had the potential to improve the 
representation of various minority groups in Congress. The 2019-2020 Congress was the most 
racially and ethnically diverse of all time, with 116 of the 435 lawmakers belonging to a minority 
group,70 including new members like Deb Haaland (Native American), Sharice Davids (Native 
American), Rashida Tlaib (Palestinian, also Muslim), Ilhan Omar (black, also Muslim), and 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (Hispanic/Latinx).71 Meanwhile, Republican gains in the House in the 
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2020 cycle primarily came from female candidates, as the number of G.O.P. women in the 
House nearly tripled from 13 to 36, just from races called by November 13th.72 While much of 
this improvement can likely be attributed to improvements in recruiting a more diverse slate of 
candidates, adding 23 new Republican women in one electoral cycle suggests that female 
candidates might have held electoral or fundraising advantages over similarly-qualified men in 
either the primary or the general election.  
It’s unclear if women have either an advantage or disadvantage in elections: A 2015 
study by Cecilia Hyunjung Mo found that, “even after controlling for explicit preferences, those 
with implicit attitudes against female candidates are less likely to vote for the female 
candidate,”73 though in that same study, she found that when presented with a choice between 
strong male and female candidates, individuals chose the female candidate 56% of the time.74 
These two findings are not necessarily mutually exclusive; if a subset of the population holds 
implicit biases against female candidates, a larger subset may have implicit biases towards 
female candidates. Such favoritism would likely present itself most in fundraising from small 
donations, which is much more reliant on specific enthusiasm, though it would of course directly 
impact election results themselves. 
More-experienced challengers should also be more likely to attract donations of any sort, 
as they are also more likely to win – individuals who have held elected office have, in most 
situations, already run successful campaigns and demonstrated their ability to attract support. 
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David Lublin studied the impact of different levels of past office on vote share, and found that 
House incumbents on average get 7% less of the vote when their opponent is a former U.S. 
Representative, vs. 5% for a Governor, Senator, or, surprisingly, lesser state officials, and 1% for 
a state legislator.75 One might expect a higher share for a Governor or a Senator, since those 
positions are more prestigious than U.S. Representative, but it’s also possible the difference is 
mostly due to noise. Either way, the “quality” or past experience (since it is difficult to 
empirically create a list of high-quality candidates) of a candidate should have an important 
impact on both fundraising and outcome measures. 
The Relationship Between Money and Electoral Outcomes 
 With the dramatic rise in campaign spending in recent cycles, we once again have to 
consider the question of whether fundraising and spending is correlated with, or has an effect on, 
electoral outcome. An assessment of many recent races suggests that it shouldn’t: As Richard 
Hasen notes, Meg Whitman spent $140 million against Jerry Brown in 2010 and lost that 
California gubernatorial election, while Dave Brat defeated Eric Cantor in a primary even though 
“Cantor’s campaign spent more at steakhouses than his more conservative opponent spent on his 
entire campaign.”76 Ultimately he claims it is just a “crass common liberal refrain that money 
simply buys elections,”77 an idea that seems to have applicability to the 2020 federal cycle. Jaime 
Harrison raised over $100 million by the end of the third quarter, $35 million more than Lindsey 
Graham, and lost by 10 points.78 Theresa Greenfield raised twice as much as incumbent Joni 
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Ernst, and lost as well.79 But Amy McGrath likely topped it by losing to Mitch McConnell by 20 
points,80 worse than Alison Grimes did in 2014,81 despite raising $88 million by September. 
Some of this can be ascribed to broader factors – as Adam Bonica notes, “outcomes in the 
general election are primarily a function of district-partisanship, and to a lesser extent, national 
partisan moods.”82 
However, money and spending should matter: First, candidates who inspire more support 
should receive more in donations, though they should specifically have a larger number of 
donors. The total amount raised can be more dependent on the size of specific donations. For 
example, a candidate who does well with $5,000 donors but not $500 donors can receive more 
money than a candidate with the converse, and the same can be done at the small donor level 
with $100 and $10. Of course, the real picture is more complex than this basic counterexample, 
but if the number of unique donors is sufficiently close, size of donations will matter. 
 The second reason why money and spending should correlate with electoral outcome 
relates more to the latter subject. By spending, a candidate is able to further “speak” and 
advertise who they are, what their political positions are, and why they should be elected. The 
more a candidate spends on organizing and advertising, the more they are able to amplify their 
message, and the more voters they are able to reach with that message. Of course, money only 
gets a candidate so far if they do not use it properly or voters tire from a bombardment of 
advertisements (with the negative connotation of trying to “buy” an election to boot). Though 
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she may have been trying to dispel the notion that House Democrats lost seats due to attitudes 
about the Progressive movement, Alexandria Ocasio Cortez stated “Conor Lamb spent $2,000 on 
Facebook the week before the election….The fact of the matter is if you’re not spending 
$200,000 on Facebook with fund-raising, persuasion, volunteer recruitment, get-out-the-vote the 
week before the election, you are not firing on all cylinders.”83  
On the other hand, the highly negative 2020 Senate race in Maine has led some voters to 
make statements to the New York Times like “the approach on the ads and campaigning was 
disgusting enough that I didn’t want to vote for the person anymore” and “to think that kind of 
money was spent is kind of like a slap in the face of America.”84 The former Maine head of 
Obama’s campaign claims that with the amount of money available “this race got out of control” 
and that “if this race is $30 million from both sides, you’re in a better place.”8586 There is also 
some evidence that ads themselves have just a marginal impact, if any at all. In 2006, Rick Perry 
was virtually assured victory in the Texas gubernatorial race, and his campaign ran a field 
experiment by running ads in randomly-chosen markets and tracking the polling results. Any 
bump from advertising disappeared within a week of when the ads stopped running.87 
It is also possible to spend loads of money without attempting to convince voters: By 
September of 2020, the Trump campaign had spent $350 million on raising additional funds, 
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nearly half of its $800 million in expenditures up to that point.88 Such a focus on spending 
money to make money clouds any connection between fundraising and natural support, as well 
as on money and results, since there is unusual extra effort towards fundraising, and that also 
takes away funds usually used to persuade voters. 
Despite the examples to the contrary, the candidate who raises the most money wins 
about 80% of Senate races and 90% of House races.89 Part of the reason the connection is so 
strong is money following winners in non-competitive or unopposed races; FiveThirtyEight’s 
Maggie Koreth states that Bonica and Richard Lau agree that “the strong raw association 
between raising the most cash and winning probably has more to do with big donors who can 
tell…that one candidate is more likely to win – and then they give that person all their money.”90 
We’ve seen this already with corporate PAC donations, where 80-90% of that money follows 
election winners.91 But when less than 20% of House seats are really at odds an given year, a 
90% win rate for the fundraising leader is still not that high. 
 The scholarly analysis of fundraising and vote share has found mixed results for 
correlation between the two. Economist Steven Levitt’s 1994 analysis of repeated candidate 
matchups in House races found that an extra $100,000 in spending, a large amount at the time, 
leads to a gain of just under 0.33 percent in vote share, an amount too low to be statistically 
significant.92 A broader range of studies have found incumbent spending to be largely 
ineffective, particularly in the House, though higher levels of incumbent spending lead to greater 
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success in Senate races.93 Prior to Levitt’s 1994 paper, many cross-sectional studies had found 
large returns on House challenger spending, though Levitt found a tenth of the return after 
controlling for candidate quality and district fixed effects.94 Meanwhile, in a study of open-seat 
House races, Brad Alexander found significant results for the positive impact of PAC 
contributions, in-state contributions, and relative spending, and for the negative impact of being 
self-financed.95 
 Even if the connection between money and success is mixed at best in general elections, 
there is better reason to believe money has an important impact on primary contests. In contested 
primaries, the candidate who raises the most money wins 79% of the time,96 a figure lower than 
that for general elections but large considering there are fewer races where victory is more-or-
less assured by district partisanship. And an OLS model developed by Adam Bonica to analyze 
the connection between fundraising and primary outcomes estimated that doubling a candidate’s 
fundraising total leads to a 45 percent increase in vote share, with both figures scaled relative to 
the contest average.97 Bonica attributes much of the connection to the importance of early 
fundraising in demonstrating the viability of a campaign – it’s the reason why EMILY’s List was 
created (it stands for Early Money is Like Yeast).98 The DCCC has also heavily emphasized 
fundraising viability, with its 2006 chair, Rahm Emmanuel, stating “the first third of your 
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campaign is money, money, money. The second third is money, money, and press. And the last 
third is votes, press, and money.”99  
This early fundraising usually comes from the individuals closest to the candidate, which 
EMILY’s List calls the “Personal Circle”: family members and close friends or professional 
contacts.100 Bonica argues this leads to the overrepresentation of lawyers101 and other wealthy 
professions in Congress, because “even the most compelling candidates will struggle to keep 
pace if their personal networks are devoid of anyone who fits the typical profile of a political 
donor.”102 Ultimately, he believes that “requiring that candidates report as a line item the number 
of unique donors giving to a campaign, regardless of donation size, alongside total receipts could 
help to better signal levels of support.”103 However, this of course assumes that fundraising 
viability has a direct relationship with primary success, as opposed to better candidates attracting 
more early money or early money giving a candidate the opportunity to run a larger campaign. 
We do know that larger campaigns once again aren’t everything, as the effect of being self-
funded is negative.104  
The other issue with the number of unique donors, and an issue that plagues the 
connection between fundraising and results, is that many of the individuals who fund a given 
campaign will live outside of that candidate’s district/state, and some candidates who do well 
with donors from other regions may not do as well with their own electorate – not to mention the 
attacks that can be levelled for being funded by “Wall Street,” “Hollywood elite,” or the Koch 
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brothers. The solution to issues like these ultimately rests in better understanding why 
individuals contribute to certain candidates and not others, but if donors are less likely to give to 
non-competitive candidates, we should expect those receiving significant funding to be 
competitive-enough candidates for their district. 
Summary 
If current trends hold, we should expect small donors to play an increasingly important 
role in funding campaigns, one that could be further magnified by Congressional legislation. The 
emergence of small donors as a viable “bucket” to draw from has the potential to make members 
of Congress less beholden to business groups and large individual contributors, both in terms of 
the constant need to fundraise and the pressure to provide desired legislative outcomes, but other 
strategies would need to take their place. If a candidate can raise $10,000 from a brief video on 
Twitter, or $100,000 from a weekly email blast, they can spend less time on the phone, but may 
differ their rhetoric and specific policy positions to cater to a different profile of individual. 
Increasing the share of contributions from small donations should increase the share that goes to 
challengers, and to more ideologically-extreme candidates, though the former is not problematic, 
perhaps unlike the latter.  
Still, as small donations move more into the mainstream, and control of government has 
become more contentious, it is possible that donation patterns have changed somewhat. Partisan 
control of Congress could be more important than ideology in directing the flow of small 
donations, and donors might also prefer to support the candidates making Congress increasingly 
diverse. Of course, even if these factors significantly affect small donations, the impact of 
ideology may not have changed. And it’s clear that, as more money enters the system, a 




may hurt those who spend too much of it, though it is still possible that a sum of small donations 
or any sum of individual donors is a strong indicator of enthusiasm for a candidate. Many of 
these questions can be answered with available data, though work done without surveying the 
donors themselves will still leave actual causes and motivations unclear. 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the relationship between ideology and a candidate’s 
receipt of small donations, establishing that candidates who have more-extreme CFscores receive 
significantly more in small donations than their peers. I will also discuss trends in small 
donations over time, and examine the possible impact of campaign strategy on fundraising 
performance. 
 
Appendix to Chapter 1: DIME/CFscores 
A common element of Adam Bonica’s work, and other recent studies in campaign 
finance, are CF-scores, also known as DIME scores, from the Database on Ideology, Money in 
Politics, and Elections (DIME).105 Unlike DW-nominate scores, which are based on roll-call 
votes, these scores are calculated based on clustering of contributors, with DW-nominate scores 
as a foundational basis. Bonica views the issue of giving as an allocation problem, where a 
contributor attempts to maximize a utility function across the set of all eligible recipients.106 The 
primary advantage of CF-scores is the ability to calculate an ideology estimate for more 
candidates than those who are current or past members of Congress (those who have a history of 
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roll-call votes). However, they still correlate well with DW-nominate scores and have some 
unique advantages. 
 On a basic level, CF-scores are very similar to DW-nominate scores: For data going back 
to 1980, Democrat scores tend to run between -2 and 1, while Republican scores run between -1 
and 2, though in 2018, a clear divide existed between the two parties in fundraising scores. I 
show this in Figures A.1 and A.2 below. The sets of scores also operate on slightly different 
scales, but ultimately we get a strong linear relationship between them, with a change of 1 point 
in contributor CF-score corresponding to a change of approximately 0.43 points in DW-nominate 
score, and a coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.83, suggesting that 83% of change in CF-score 
could be explained by the variation in DW-nominate score. 
 This result should not be surprising due to issue constraint, the correlation between 
preferences across issues. For example, as Keith Poole noted in 2005, “in contemporary 
American politics the knowledge that a politician opposes raising the minimum wage makes it 
virtually certain that she opposes universal health care, opposes affirmative action, … In short, 
that she is a conservative and almost certainly a Republican.”107 Based on a politician’s party 
identification and their stance on one or two specific issues, a donor can then guess the 
remaining issue positions of a candidate, which would then reflect itself in an eventual Nominate 
score (for those who win). While they may be different from the typical political donor, many 
ideologically-focused PACs demonstrate how donations can be used to discern ideological 
differences between members of the same party. On the Republican side, we should expect a 
candidate supported by the Council for Citizens Against Government Waste to be more 
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conservative than a candidate funded by the Main Street PAC108, named for a more moderate 
faction of the party. On the Democratic side, candidates supported by the Blue Dog Democrats 
will be more moderate, and (due to issue constraint) we might expect the same for anyone 
accepting money from the NRA. 
An important aspect of Nominate scores that is often ignored is how issues that come up 
for votes more often end up affecting scores more than issues that come up once or never.109 Due 
to issue constraint, the correlation of political preferences across issues, we should not expect 
that to impact scores too much, but CF-scores have an advantage in reflecting issues more 
prominent in campaign rhetoric than in the halls of Congress. As Bonica notes, issues like 
abortion and the rights of same-sex couples “feature prominently in campaign rhetoric and are a 
frequent subject of ballot initiatives” but “in any given Congress it is rare to see more than a 
dozen roll call votes” on those specific issues.110  However, without knowledge of the predictive 
space (the original issue positions) and the weights given to specific issues, it’s difficult to make 
a direct comparison between measures of ideology.111 The CF-scores also perform well as a 
predictive measure; however, as Bonica was able to use fundraising information in a machine 
learning model to predict future DW-nominate scores just as accurately as Nokken-Poole 
estimates, which use roll call votes from a legislator’s first two-year Congressional term.112 In 
addition, CFscores are considered significant, even when controlling for party, when used to 
model responses to a set of 19 CCES policy items.113 Similarly, in a separate paper Bonica also 
found that CF-scores predict roll call votes at a rate just 1% worse (0.928 vs. 0.938) than DW-
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nominate scores (which are already pulled from those same roll call votes), though using party 
ID alone led to 91.8% accuracy.114 
 
 Figure 1a: DW-Nominate vs. CFscores, 1980-2018 
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Chapter 2: The Factors Influencing Small Donations 
 Small donations are primed to play a substantial role in the 2022 or 2024 federal 
campaign cycles, though the level of their importance heavily depends on the legislative outcome 
of the public financing provisions of H.R. 1, the For the People Act. H.R. 1 was passed originally 
by the House of Representatives in 2019, and was passed again in March 2021.115 Under Title V 
of the Act, candidates can receive $6 in public funds for every dollar they receive in small 
campaign contributions,116 with two major stipulations: First, candidates cannot receive more 
than $1,000 from any individual donor, and second, candidates must refund any contributions 
that exceed the $200 “small donor” cap if they used funding from the specific donor to receive 
public matching.117 Importantly, there is no language restricting the matching funds to donations 
from the same state or district as the candidate, allowing larger donors to behave more 
strategically by spreading money across more candidates, but also allowing small donors to play 
a significant role in races in which they cannot vote. The 2019 draft of H.R. 1 also includes a 
three-state118 pilot program for $25 campaign finance vouchers to be distributed to all voting-age 
residents who are not otherwise ineligible to make campaign contributions.119 
Money isn’t everything; sometimes it won’t make a difference, and other times it won’t 
be needed. Michael Bloomberg ultimately won just 44 delegates in his quest to be the 
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Democratic nominee for President in 2020,120 while Dave Brat successfully primaried House 
Majority Leader Eric Cantor despite spending just $206,000 in 2014.121 However, if fundraising, 
or small donations more specifically, has a positive impact on electoral success, then increases in 
the share of small donations in campaign finance will cause Congress to have more politicians 
who better attract small donations. Understanding who is more likely to benefit from increased 
small donations can help predict possible consequences of H.R. 1, or from any increase in the 
share of small donations in campaign finance. 
Small donations have been shown to go towards more ideologically-extreme candidates 
when compared to their “large” counterparts. In a 2019 study of small donations in 2006-2010 
U.S. House elections, Tyler Culberson, Michael McDonald, and Suzanne Robbins found that the 
most ideologically extreme incumbents raised $306,557 more than the most moderate 
incumbents.122 Such a finding fits with the profile of the “typical” political donor. While most of 
the 30 largest donors have CFscores123 more-moderate than the party averages,124 the distribution 
of all donors against self-described ideology is bimodal.125 Meanwhile, both Republican126 and 
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Democratic donors127 are more likely to contribute to candidates if they view the opposing party 
as more extreme or unfavorable. Not only are more-extreme individuals more likely to 
contribute, but they weight a candidate’s ideology more heavily than possible access or party 
control of government when deciding to donate.128 This is further corroborated by the 
relationship between business interests and election winners. 80-90% of corporate PAC money 
goes to those election winners, compared to 48-55% of small donations,129 and, as a partial 
consequence, challengers raise 21% of their campaign cash from small donors compared to 7% 
for incumbents.130 The egalitarian spread of small donations compared to the concentration of 
corporate money must be caused by differing motivations amongst donors. Expanding the impact 
of existing small donations may then be less healthy for our political system than encouraging 
new, more moderate donors to give to candidates, such as through H.R. 1’s proposed voucher 
program. 
There are also benefits to increasing the role of small donations in campaign finance. 
Under our current campaign finance system, former Representatives have been candid with 
quotes like “money changed votes.”131 Even when money is not exchanged with the implication 
of support on a specific issue, politicians hear more about issues faced by the wealthy and 
specific interest groups when raising money from lobbyists and through “call time.” Members of 
Congress spend anywhere from 30-70 percent of their time fundraising,132 something Rodney 
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Alexander called “not fair for the member, not fair for constituency.”133 Ultimately, a member of 
Congress is not going to spend half an hour on the phone with a $100 donor, but they are likely 
to spend that much time, or longer, with a lobbyist or max donor. One person and their spouse 
can give over $10,000 to a candidate for an election cycle, while a lobbyist can “bundle”134 
contributions from multiple sources. Members of Congress and other candidates who take 
advantage of public matching would not have the same need to get on the phone and may be 
encouraged to cater more towards their larger base of supporters than to large donors and special 
interests. At the bare minimum, a public funding system can work to undermine the charge that 
that special interests drive legislative and executive policy. Concerns can of course be raised 
about the profiles of smaller donors, but when compared to the 15,810 people who accounted for 
half of all contributions in 2016, the issues they face should be more representative of those 
faced by the average American.135 
Study, Data, and Methodology 
The analysis in this chapter will focus on the connection between several candidate and 
electoral factors and small donations received. The particular interest is candidate ideology, but 
because donations can also be influenced by candidate factors like gender and experience, or 
district factors like competitiveness and income, their relationships can also be quantified by a 
multivariate model in which they are included as controlling factors.136 I also control for the 
amount a candidate receives in large donations, as a proxy for candidate popularity, since those 
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candidates should receive larger dollar amounts of both large and small donations, whether due 
to specific charismatic qualities or the nature of their race. The relationship between these 
variables will be explained by a linear model run in R software. 
Data on fundraising was acquired from the Federal Election Commission’s candidate 
summary files,137 one of which is available for each election cycle. The FEC also publishes 
election results in separate files for House and Senate elections, for both primary and general 
elections. This study focuses on general elections, though donations large and small may have a 
larger impact in the primary cycle, when candidates attempt to show viability, establish name 
recognition, and turn out the vote – all issues that are lessened in a longer campaign that ends on 
Election Day. 
Most other data, including candidate ideology scores (DW-Nominate and CFscores), 
were acquired from Adam Bonica’s Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections 
(DIME). Candidates in the DIME dataset can be matched to their fundraising and election results 
in FEC data through the use of their candidate IDs, 9-digit alphanumeric codes that begin with 
“H” or “S” depending on the office, and whose 3rd and 4th letters are the state postal code. I am 
also using Bonica’s dataset for candidate gender and Democratic Presidential vote share, a proxy 
for district partisanship. The dataset includes election results, though not for 2018, and 
incumbency status, though there appear to be some errors where challengers (running against 
incumbents) are sometimes labeled as running for open seats, and vice versa. 
I have coded candidates as challengers or as running for an open seat using the Jacobson-






office, which is a common measure of candidate quality. A more specific coding of the highest 
office held by a candidate would be useful, though it is not available for this study. In a study by 
David Lublin, former U.S. Representatives, Governors, and lesser state officials on average 
received at least 5% more of the vote, compared to 1% more for state legislators, in comparison 
to inexperienced candidates.138  
Median district income was acquired from Adam Isacson’s data on the 116th Congress.139 
I will be using the 2018 income data for 2016, 2018, and 2020, as the economic health of a 
region is likely not to have changed significantly in either two-year gap. Even though donors can 
contribute to federal candidates from any state, we should still expect donors to show a degree of 
favoritism towards local candidates, who might be more liked and better-known. As such, 
candidates from wealthier districts should receive more large and small donations than 
candidates from poorer districts. 
Some factors cannot be controlled for in the model. A candidate can seek small donations 
as part of their political strategy. Small donations can be acquired for “free” (simply from 
existing supporters seeking to contribute through a candidate’s website, or as a consequence of 
cost-lite measures like email blasts), but they can also be encouraged by digital advertisements, 
promotional materials, and media appearances, all of which come at the expense of either money 
or time. Using data on digital advertising would help account for strategy differences, though 
such data are limited in scope (and can only be used for partial tests; I explore such data later in 
Chapter 2 and again in Chapter 3). 
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The linear models in this chapter and Chapter 3 use R’s lm() function, which uses the 
ordinary least squares method of linear regression analysis. The multiple linear regression 
predicts the dependent variable (in this chapter, that will generally be total small donations) as a 
combination of linear functions of each independent variable or control. Regression aims to 
minimize the difference between the actual and expected values of the dependent variable for 
each set of independent variable inputs. Ordinary least squares (OLS) will find the minimum 
sum of squares of the difference between those actual and expected values, rather than 
minimizing just the sum of the direct difference between values. 
 
Results and Analysis 
Using data from the DIME database and FEC data, Figure 1 displays trends in small 
contributions since 1980, the first election cycle for which Bonica displays data. Despite 
disclosure requirements not changing in in that timespan, small donations gradually crept 
upwards from 1980 to 2016, though there was no direct trend, with the 1982 “peak” in donations 
remaining unmatched until 2006. The level of donations may indicate a certain amount of 
interest in an election cycle, given the motivations and partisanship of most small donors, but 
economic changes do not appear to have had a major impact on the number of dollars spent. It’s 
possible that this consistency in the total amount of small donations comes from decreases in the 
total number of small donors that would come from some donors moving over the cap from one 






Data for 2018 and 2020 acquired from the FEC. 
 
 
Figure 1, but with 2018 and 2020 ommitted, to better show cycle-to-cycle fluctuation 
 





It may be more helpful, though, to examine the share of small donations in election 
cycles, as there exist longer-term trends on increases in campaign spending.140 Figure 2 
demonstrates that the proportion of small donations as a share of total funding, not just individual 
contributions, of federal campaigns decreased from 1980 to 2008, but has risen sharply in the 
two most recent cycles. Ultimately, the causes behind the increase in other forms of contributions 
over time and the sudden shift against small contributions in the mid-1980s are beyond the scope 
of this paper, but only now is the increase in small donations outpacing corresponding increases 
in other contributions. 
 The substantial changes in small donations in the 2018 and 2020 cycles are likely related 
to the increasing prominence of the online fundraising platforms ActBlue and WinRed. On these 
sites, candidates create accounts and donation forms, and individuals are then able to access 
those online forms to contribute using electronic payment methods like credit cards. The sites 
then pass on the money to the candidate (as an individual contribution, they are not PACs) and 
report the contribution to the FEC. ActBlue has been registered with the FEC since 2004, but in 
2016 it processed just $679 million in donations compared to $1.2 billion in 2018 and an 
astounding $4 billion in 2020,141 albeit a year with a very crowded Democratic Presidential field. 
WinRed, meanwhile, processed $1.8 billion in 2020, its first election cycle.142 While online 
platforms make contributing to a candidate easier, it’s unlikely that ease of access is entirely 
responsible for this shift. Candidates may have become better at leveraging digital advertising 
and social media to encourage online donations, and it’s possible that the Trump presidency has 
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2018 and 2020 again omitted to better display prior years. Democratic and Republican figures for 2014 are heavily 
overlapping. 
 
Figure 3 breaks out the totals by party. Since 2002, Democrats have consistently 
outpaced their Republican rivals in generating small donations, though the Republican haul of 
$155 million in 2010 was the highest total for either party prior to 2018’s wave election. Most 
importantly, neither party held a significant year-to-year advantage prior to 2016. Democrats 




That gap was roughly the same $250 million in 2020, but the increases in both totals meant 
Republicans did comparatively better in 2020 by raising 63% of the Democratic total compared 
to a pitiful 31% in 2018. Of course, Democrats did not do as well electorally with a smaller 
advantage in 2016. Still, it would be difficult to refute the premise that partisan enthusiasm, 
perhaps facilitated by campaigns and online platforms, drove the recent outliers in 2010 and 
2018-2020. 
Variable Relationships and Model Results 
 
Both U.S. House and Senate candidates included. 
 
Figure 4 graphs ideology and small donations for 2016 and 2018. The results do not 
indicate a linear relationship between the two variables, as fundraising totals follow more of a 
“bell curve.” None of the high fund-raising totals are from candidates with a CFscore greater 
than 2. More broadly, this demonstrates how large totals of small donations tend to come from 
outliers who raise significantly more than their peers. 18 candidates (of 1,597) in the data set 
raised over $5 million from small donors, 14 of them in 2018, and raised a combined total of 





2016-2018. District partisanship calculated from the difference between Democratic and Republican shares of the 




It is possible that less partisan districts, which should attract more competitive races and 
encourage donors to spend, also have more moderate nominees who can be more “competitive” 
and better appeal to swing voters or the opposing party. This would suggest a positive 
relationship between district partisanship and candidate ideology. As Figure 5 shows, though, for 
general election candidates in 2016 and 2018, such a relationship is not readily apparent. As 
always there are very few candidates with CFscores above 2, but more of them come from 
competitive districts than from safe seats. Indeed, we find a negative relationship, suggesting that 
increased district partisanship leads to less extreme candidates. The correlation is statistically 
significant, but a near-zero R-squared value of 0.02 suggests the substantive effect is very small. 
 Modeling a direct linear relationship between unitemized donation totals,143 those under 
$200, and candidate extremism from 1980-2018, with the latter variable measured as the 
absolute value of CFscore, gives a highly significant relationship with a p-value of less than 
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0.001 and a coefficient of 19,330, meaning a candidate with a CFscore of 1 or -1 will on average 
receive $19,330 more in small donations than a candidate with a CFscore of 0. The R-squared 
value for this relationship, however, is less than 0.001, suggesting that the variation in small 
donations remains unexplained.  
Much of this issue comes from the changing levels of small donations over time. When 
$120 million in small donations is split across several thousand candidates, many candidates, 
including primary winners, can report only a few thousand dollars in unitemized totals. 
Meanwhile, Beto O’Rourke reported over $30 million in small donations in 2018. The 
correlation between the small donation totals and CFscores can be attributed to the gradual 
disappearance of candidates with CFscores close to 0,144 and the gradual rise in small donations. 
Ultimately, even removing the outlying 2018 data and analyzing candidates with a minimum of 
$10,000 raised from small donations does not strengthen the explanatory value past 0.01. 
A multivariate model produces a better “fit.” Using data from the 2016 and 2018 U.S. 
House elections, itemized individual donations, candidate ideology, and district partisanship all 
demonstrate strong significance in determining a candidate’s level of small donations, while 
candidate gender and district median income have a weaker but still-significant correlation. See 
Table 1. Whether a candidate has held prior office is just not strong enough despite a t-score of -
1.7 (see rightmost column of Table 1). Surprisingly, candidates only receive a predicted extra 
$100,000 to $250,000 from a one-point increase on the CFscore index; the most extreme 
Democratic and Republican incumbents, Bernie Sanders and Jody Hice, have CFscores of -1.828 
 




and 1.482, respectively. Candidates raise less in small donations if they come from a wealthier 
district, less if they’ve held prior office, and less if they run in a more-competitive district.  
Controlling for the number of large donations makes the total receipts a candidate 
receives from small donations more significant, and it suggests that experienced candidates from 
wealthier, more-competitive areas may also just have an advantage in fundraising from large 
donors. Existing members of Congress do use “call time,” and donors looking for influence 
would certainly want to give to candidates winning non-competitive races, but also competitive 
challengers over less-competitive ones. The direction of median income also indicates that while 
wealthier districts will have more potential donors, district income may correlate more with the 
amount of donations rather than the number of donors. 
Table 1: Predicting Small Donations 






U.S. House only 
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-0.4422 
(.033) 
Held Elected Office? 
(Yes) 
   -0.2730  
(.145) 


























District Partisanship 4.178   
(.016) 




1.817   
(.065) 
House or Senate? Both Both Both House 
R2 0.6278 0.6288 0.6694 .4361 
Degrees of Freedom 1533 1520 777 1396 
Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in 




 A similar relationship is demonstrated in the model that excludes holding prior office, 
which allows for the inclusion of U.S. Senators and their opponents. There are slightly higher 
coefficients for all variables, though none change direction and all except median income stay 
significant. The relationship between candidate gender and fundraising becomes very significant, 
with female candidates raising $95,000 more than their equivalent male colleagues. This 
relationship was still significant, though smaller, with prior office included, which accounts for 
attempts to recruit “better” female candidates. Organizations like EMILY’s List could potentially 
play a role in the fundraising success of these candidates, though they only support pro-choice 
Democratic candidates and there is no clear Republican equivalent. There is also no significant 
relationship when only 2018 Democratic House candidates are considered, so Republicans likely 
play an important role in the connection between gender and fundraising from small 
donations.145 
 The primary factor driving small donations in these models, though, is large donations. 
Candidates can expect to receive 40 cents in small donations for every dollar in larger individual 
contributions – an expected 28% share of individual contributions. Thus, a serious candidate who 
raises $720,000 from larger individual contributions should on average receive $280,000 in small 
donations. Removing these contributions from the model, meanwhile, decreases the R2 value to 
just 0.02, while modeling a linear relationship between just large and small contributions for all 
candidates gives roughly the same coefficient and an R2 value of 0.62. This indicates that the 
reasons candidates receive large donations should ultimately be very similar to the reasons 
candidates receive small donations. In particular, candidate name recognition is not included but 
is likely significant in deciding who receives both small donations and some larger contributions. 
 




$200 may also not be a particularly good “dividing line” in terms of these donor motivations; 
individuals looking for attention from a candidate will likely need to be closer to the ceiling of 
$5,000 per “donation.” Donors in the $200-$1,000 range are likely wealthier than small donors, 
but $50 and $100 contributors have to have a certain amount of disposable income or desire to 
give. 
Table 2: Predicting Small Donation Share 
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R2 .1995 .2386 .2333 .222 
DF 1513 1502 773 1377 
Dependent variable changed to small donations as a share of total donations. Estimates from linear regression 
models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in parentheses. 
 
 To test this further, I analyzed the same data while changing the dependent variable to be 
a candidate’s share of small donations received. The explanatory variables have somewhat weak 
effects, which makes sense when all sorts of candidates can end up with a low share of small 
donations, muddling at least part of the picture. Despite this, ideology has a statistically 
significant effect, with one point in CFscore suggesting that a candidate’s share of small 




 Moving beyond ideology, a candidate’s share of small donations is only weakly related to 
district partisanship and insignificantly related to median income. The weak effect from district 
partisanship (shown in Figure 6) is more confusing, as the results from modeling small donation 
totals suggested that candidates in less-competitive districts received more small donations when 
controlling for larger donations. Figure 7 shows that perhaps that effect was driven by some 
outlying cases. 
 
Figure 6: Share of Small Donations and District Partisanship and Income, 2018  
 
Figure 7: Total Small Donations and District Partisanship and Income, 2018 
 
 More specifically, Figures 6-7 explore the relationship by plotting median income and 




(unitemized) contributions. There appears to be a slight negative relationship for district 
partisanship, with most candidates who raised 50% of their funds from small contributions 
competing in less-partisan districts. 
Narrowing the data to more “serious” candidates may provide greater insight, but the 
challenge may also lie in the difficulty of deciding how to structure the model. Modeling small 
donations by controlling for “large” donations provides more explanatory power, and this 
suggests that the causes of small donation totals are similar to the ones for larger donations. On 
the other hand, modeling the share of donations should pick up the differential effect of various 
factors on small donation fundraising. For example, more-minor candidates can raise virtually 
any share of their total contributions in small donations, if they are not raising a large total. 
Ultimately, if a variable or control is significant for both types of measurements (total versus 
share), we can be confident in its importance. 
Returning to a sum as the dependent variable, the strongest model in Table 1 comes from 
controlling for the Democratic Party’s 2018 surge in donations by restricting the year to 2018 
and adding a party variable.146 For 2018 major-party candidates, party is still insignificant, 
probably because the surge in small donations didn’t reach all Democrats, though the direction is 
correctly against Republicans and suggests Democrats raised $25,000 more than comparable 
Republicans. The coefficient for ideology is raised to $247,000 for 1 point in CFscore, at that 
point marking a spread of over $400,000 between the most moderate Democratic incumbents and 
Sanders. Gender also becomes insignificant when party is included, so there may be a 
relationship between gender and party that leads to better (or worse) fundraising for a subset of 
 




candidates. District partisanship also becomes a much stronger factor, now suggesting candidates 
from the most extreme districts (PVI of +50) raise over $500,000 more in small donations than 
candidates from the most even districts. 
 Incumbents do not actually raise substantially more from individuals than the typical 
general election challenger, though in this entire discussion I’ve excluded challengers who 
receive fewer than 10 percent of the vote. Incumbents in 2016 and 2018 raised $1,471,518 from 
individuals on average, with $1,161,319 coming from itemized contributions and $310,199 
coming from unitemized (small) contributions, a 21% share. Challengers, meanwhile, raised 
$1,276,750, with $954,614 from itemized contributions and $322,135 from unitemized 
contributions, a 25% share. The entire difference in fundraising comes from the difference in 
large donations, indicating that incumbents are more popular with large donors relative to their 
popularity with small donors, though this does not indicate specifically whether incumbents are 
more popular with large donors or challengers are more popular with small donors. 
There are several possible explanations for the relatively-small overall difference in 
average fundraising between challengers and incumbents: First, parties performing better in the 
national environment likely have an enthusiasm and fundraising advantage, and can spend more 
heavily on challengers running in competitive races. Second, incumbents in “safe” districts may 
not need to raise much more than challengers, because they are virtually assured reelection by 
winning their primary. Third, challengers often need to “overcome” any advantages of 
incumbency (the incumbent is a proven winner whom voters are already familiar with), which 






Table 3: Incumbency Status and Small-Dollar Fundraising (2016-2018) 





































R2 .6041 .6861 
DF 756 757 
Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in 
parentheses. Dollar totals again in the hundred thousands for independent and dependent variables. 
 
 
 The results in Table 3 look at incumbents and challengers separately. Incumbents follow 
a pattern more similar to the earlier models, with an even-stronger coefficient of $470,000 for 
every point in CFscore in Table 3. There is a much stronger relationship between small donations 
and district partisanship, and gender has a significant effect on fundraising. One wouldn’t 
necessarily expect female incumbents to raise more than their male colleagues, since any desire 
to support greater gender equality in Congress, or any inherent electoral advantage women have, 
could be rendered largely irrelevant when only incumbents are compared. Individuals interested 
in getting more women in Congress should be more likely to contribute to female challengers. 
This makes the significance of gender on small donations difficult to explain. The difference of 
about $700,000 (using the left column of table 3) between the most moderate and extreme 




of $300,000 between those poles in 2006-2010,147 but follows from the substantial increase in 
small donations in 2018. 
 However, challengers act much differently than incumbents. Gender, district partisanship, 
and median income are not significant. Ideology still has a significant relationship, though less 
than with incumbents, and a much lower coefficient of $93,000. Since this model only considers 
general election candidates, it is likely that more extreme challengers also have a lower chance of 
unseating incumbents, which should negatively affect their ability to raise money. 
Reviewing Outliers 
As previously stated, 18 candidates who raised over $5 million in small donations 
combined for 28% of all small donations received among 2016 and 2018 candidates. As Figure 8 
will show, no candidate was expected to raise more than $1 million from small donations. 
Knowledge of what candidates significantly outperform their expected totals, some of whom 
faced competitive elections but some of whom did not, is helpful in terms of understanding what 
other factors might drive small donations. 
Rather predictably, the candidates with the largest residuals, or the difference between 
their actual fundraising total and the fundraising total expected from the model, tend to be 
Democrats running in 2018 or Senate candidates more broadly; other than Devin Nunes, the 10 
candidates with the largest residuals are all Senators, mostly incumbents, with CFscores 
generally in the 1-2 (or -1 to -2) range, excepting Florida Senator Bill Nelson, who lost to former 
Governor Rick Scott in 2018, who had a score of 0.75. 
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The list is full of recognizable names: Except for the current, Nevada Senate delegation, 
those 10 were all incumbents or former incumbents (Russ Feingold lost his Wisconsin seat in 
2010 and ran for it again in 2018). Nelson, Heidi Heitkamp, Claire McCaskill, and Ted Cruz 
were all defending competitive seats, while Feingold, Rosen, and Cortez-Masto were challenging 
for them. The outliers who did not face competitive races are Warren, Sanders, and Nunes, the 
former two known for supporting policies like a “wealth tax,” while Nunes chaired the House 
Intelligence Committee from 2015-2019, giving him prominence from investigations into Hillary 
Clinton and possible anti-Trump activity. Overall, name recognition or identification of 
Candidate Raised Above 
Expected ($) 
CFscore 
Elizabeth Warren 12,938,357 -1.525 
Rafael “Ted” Cruz 11,441,166 1.391 
Heidi Heitkamp 10,932,091 -1.154 
Claire McCaskill 10,688,470 -1.254 
Russell Feingold 9,404,377 -1.358 
Jacky Rosen 7,922,632 -1.411 
Bernard Sanders 7,826,411 -1.828 
Bill Nelson 6,721,667 -0.750 







promising challengers/vulnerable incumbents seems to play a large role in the fundraising 
success of these “top 10” candidates.148 
Figure 8: Expected Small Donations vs. Actual 
 
Online Fundraising Strategies 
 No data exists to effectively measure candidate strategy (i.e., an explicit target of small 
donors over large donors) and include it in a model. Candidates do not all have the same 
fundraising or campaign strategy, both of which impact donations (one more directly than the 
other). Incumbents may more easily rely on large contributors, particularly those with business 
interests who may want to back a winner, while challengers may take several different 
approaches, or try some combination of strategies (they often have much less time and 
 
148 Candidates without a CFscore from the DIME dataset, including Beto O’Rourke, Ted Cruz’s Democratic 
challenger from the 2018 Texas Senate race, have been excluded from the data and analysis. It is unclear why that 




experience) to gain financial support. While many elements of campaign and fundraising 
strategy (events, emails, phone calls) are difficult or impossible to measure on a macro level, 
many candidates advertise digitally and include fundraising links in those advertisements (often 
with an explicit ask for contributions). Thus, candidates who spend more on digital advertising, 
generally on social media, may receive a larger share of small contributions than those who 
spend less. 
 Facebook publishes information about political spending on the “Report” page of its Ad 
Library.149 The published information includes a page name, amount spent in a given period, and 
the number of ads in the Library. Facebook’s data runs back to May 2018, but does not allow for 
selections of specific date windows for which that information can be pulled. To explore any 
relationship between Facebook spending and small donations, I pulled data from October 2020 to 
January 2021, and applied it to 2016 and 2018 candidates who were again running in 2020 (Jon 
Ossoff was excluded), as well as running a bivariate model analyzing just Facebook spending 
and small donor fundraising for only 2020 candidates. For those 2020 candidates, Facebook 
spending has a significant (p < .001), positive relationship with their share of small donations 
received, but that relationship becomes negative and insignificant (p = 0.44) when total 
fundraising is included as a control.150 This relationship stays insignificant (p = 0.47) for the 
subset of 2016 & 2018 candidates, though it is nearly significant when the dependent variable is 
small donations as a proportion of total funding received. Candidates who raise more money may 
receive more in small donations and spend more on Facebook advertising, but it does not appear 
 
149 https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/report/. 




that Facebook spending and small donations are themselves related (at least with the limited data 
I can gather on digital ad spending). 
 On the other hand, Facebook spending does decrease the correlation between ideology, 
gender, and a candidate’s aggregate small donations raised (comparing Table 5 to Table 2, which 
does not incorporate Facebook spending). Facebook spending does not have any sort of direct 
relationship with those donations once fundraising is included as a control, but if more 
ideologically-extreme candidates are more likely to advertise digitally and to raise money from 
small donations, that would weaken the direct relationship between ideology and small donations 
in the model. There may in fact be a degree of weakness in the direct relationship between 
ideology and small donations, but it should be explored in-depth with data all from the same time 
period (as it stands, DIME scores are not available for 2020 candidates, nor are official vote 
totals from the FEC). 




































R2 .2082 .5006 
DF 368 367 
Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in 




Importance of Results and Need for Further Investigation 
 In addition to the dominant factor of larger individual contributions, candidate ideology is 
significant in determining their level of small donations received in all but the final model. The 
difference between the most moderate and extreme incumbents leads to an additional $250,000 
to $450,000 in small donations. This may have to do with the “base” of party candidates being 
just above a CFscore of 1, though outlier candidates like Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders 
undoubtedly push the model in that direction as well. If the model accurately represents the 
relationship between ideology and small donations, though, more extreme candidates already 
have a substantial fundraising advantage that could be doubled, tripled, or quadrupled by the 
public matching provisions of H.R.1: A theoretical candidate who receives all their money in 
public funding can increase their take seven-fold, but all candidates face some sort of trade-off 
between public funding and lower caps on donations. Whether this difference will actually give 
candidates an electoral advantage remains to be seen, but any advantage would be most 
prominent in primaries, due to presumed decreasing returns to scale on dollars spent, between 
more-moderate and more-extreme candidates. 
 If a connection exists, though, it may be helpful in keeping members of Congress directly 
accountable to voters, though those voters would often just be the loudest, most active, and 
extreme voices. Primary challenges fueled by extremist party wings could substantially increase 
gridlock in Congress or turn off more-moderate citizens from becoming involved in the political 
sphere. This assumes that polarization leading to less bipartisan action in Congress is a negative, 
but individual readers will all have their own opinions. The graphs included n the Appendix to 
Chapter 1 do demonstrate that even though Republican members of Congress who ran for office 




drifted away from one another. CFscores are better at demonstrating how candidates compare to 
one another than to a body of issues, but it is fair to say small donations help more-extreme 
candidates in both parties. 
Finance vouchers then become a superior reform when compared to donor matching, 
with the hope that getting new donors involved in the financing process leads to less-extreme 
candidates or at least offsets giving partisans more money to donate. On the other hand, the still-
inexplicable connection between female candidates and small donations could portend a 
somewhat-easier road to a gender-balanced Congress, an end result that may not necessarily have 
a real impact, but may help half the population see themselves reflected in Congress. 
 Understanding what types of candidates receive small donations is crucial to discerning 
the benefits and downsides of some “democratizations” of campaign finance. While this model 
clearly demonstrates how more ideologically-extreme candidates benefit from small donations, 
modeling the relationship still leads to several questions for further research. There exist both 
benefits and downsides to examining a candidate’s aggregate total of small donations, or viewing 
it as a share of a total, though using both to determine significance is a possible solution. On the 
other hand, the incorporation of Facebook spending into a smaller sample suggests strategy 
influences the relationship between ideology and small donations, though why it does is thus far 
unclear when Facebook spending itself is not correlated with increased small donations. A 
deeper understanding of this relationship with Facebook spending or digital advertising more 
broadly will be helpful in better understanding the connection between ideology and 






Chapter 3: Small Donations, Fundraising, and Votes 
 Ultimately, the impact of ideology and other specific candidate traits on fundraising from 
small donations, as found in the second chapter, is irrelevant unless those traits or that 
fundraising also impacts how well a candidate performs in a primary or general election. From 
the median voter theorem,151 candidates who are closer to the center ideologically should attract 
more votes than candidates who are more extreme, even if more-extreme candidates are more 
successful with small donors (who are themselves more extreme than the population as a whole). 
Candidate experience (holding prior elected office), meanwhile, correlates with 1 to 7 percentage 
point gain in vote share depending on the office.152 We would expect those advantages for 
experienced candidates to decrease as the number of cross-pressured and “persuadable” voters 
decreases from social sorting153 and increased partisanship. As for gender, a more-recent study 
by Cecilia Hyunjung Mo found that individuals chose the “strong” female candidate 56% of the 
time when presented with a choice between that candidate and a “strong” male candidate,154 a 
finding that would be in line with some fundraising models suggesting female candidates were 
more popular with small donors. 
 However, there is a long-unresolved question of whether spending money ultimately 
leads candidates to greater electoral success. Recent history of campaigns is littered with high 
spenders who ultimately flamed out, whether it was Michael Bloomberg and Tom Steyer in the 
 
151 David Henderson, “Don’t Ignore the Median Voter Theorem,” The Library of Economics and Liberty, October 
19, 2019, https://www.econlib.org/dont-ignore-the-median-voter-theorem/. 
152 David Ian Lublin, “Quality, Not Quantity: Strategic Politicians in U.S. Senate Elections, 1952-1990,” The 
Journal of Politics 56, no. 1 (February 1994): 232. 
153 In which members of political parties begin to look more homogeneous, living in the same communities, coming 
from similar backgrounds, and so forth. A separate phenomenon is parties also becoming more homogeneous in 
their issue positions, and both of these lead to less cross-pressuring. 
154 Cecilia Hyunjung Mo, “The Consequences of Explicit and Implicit Gender Attitudes and Candidate Quality in 




2020 Democratic Presidential Primary or Sara Gideon in the 2020 Maine Senate election, where 
Gideon raised $75 million (spending only $63 million) to Susan Collins’s $30 million,155 only to 
finish with an 8-point loss.156 On the end of the spectrum, Dave Brat successfully primaried 
House Majority Leader Eric Cantor in 2014 despite Cantor “spending more at steakhouses” than 
Brat spent on his entire primary campaign (he raised all of $200,000).157 Of course, in many 
competitive races the candidate who spends more money wins,158 but it is hardly a guarantee. 
 General studies of campaign spending and election outcome have found a confusing mix 
of results for this relationship. Steven Levitt159 found that an extra $100,000 in spending led to 
just a 0.33% increase in vote share. His study was from 1994, when $100,000 in spending was 
still large; moreover, the estimated effect was not statistically significant.160 Further, controlling 
for candidate quality and district fixed effects lowered the estimated effect by 90%.161 Overall, 
researchers have been unable to tie incumbent spending in the House to increased electoral 
success, though spending has been shown as beneficial to Senate candidates and House 
challengers.162 
 
155 OpenSecrets.org, “Maine Senate 2020 Race” (web page), Center for Responsive Politics (website), accessed 
April 17, 2021, https://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary?cycle=2020&id=MES2. 
156 Collins won 51-42.5 in the first round of ranked-choice voting, and Green Party candidate Lisa Savage received 
5%, suggesting the final margin would have been somewhat closer. 
157 Richard Hasen, Plutocrats United: Campaign Money, the Supreme Court, and the Distortion of American 
Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016): 12. 
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 However, there are seemingly tangible benefits to raising more in campaign 
contributions. Candidates can use that money to advertise in print, on the air, and over the 
internet, and to put themselves or other campaign representatives (whether paid employees, 
volunteers, political allies, or other members of a ticket) in front of voters. In these appearances, 
candidates focus on convincing persuadable voters to back them in an election and convince their 
supporters to turn out to vote. Most conventional wisdom on winning an election focuses on the 
former, though Rachel Bitecofer163 claims this “Chuck Todd theory of American politics” should 
be replaced by the idea that “What matters is what percentage of the electorate is Republican and 
Republican leaners, and what percentage is Democratic and Democratic leaners, and how they 
get activated.”164 Both sides would agree that the same exact electorate does not show up every 
year, and that there is a share of that electorate that is persuadable, but the contention comes in 
how many people that is: Bitecofer claims that it is only about 6% of the electorate, while Sam 
Wang of the Princeton Election Commission claims it is roughly 10%.165 Either way, campaign 
spending and the resulting spread of messages to voters should have an impact on the share or 
number of votes a candidate receives. 
 Some academics argue, however, that campaign contact has little impact on the 
electorate. In an analysis of 49 different field experiments studying the impact of campaign 
contact and advertising, Joshua Kalla and David Broockman claim “the best estimate for the 
 
163 While Bitecofer is not necessarily liked for her “Krassenstein Brothers approach for getting attention for her 
forecasts,” referring to the tactic of replying to more popular posts on Twitter by offering a conflicting opinion, she 
is a relatively recognizable proponent of this view.   








persuasive effects of campaign contact and advertising…in general elections is zero.”166 In 
particular, contact with individuals decays over time, making it ineffective before the lead-up to 
election day, and persuasive contact close to election day is then ineffective even in the short-
term.167 The only cases in which messages are demonstrated to have persuasive effects are when 
a candidate takes an unpopular position and “persuadable, cross-pressured voters”168 are properly 
identified and targeted with communication focusing on that position.169 Importantly, messaging 
also did not demonstrate any turnout effects among supporters,170 suggesting that no matter 
whether electoral swings are caused by opinion changes or turnout changes, they do not come 
from the persuasive outreach of campaigns (though specific “get out the vote” operations do 
boost turnout171). Kalla and Broockman do note, though, that there may be effects from 
candidate qualities, positions, or overall “message,” and from more-effective persuasion.172 
 There are several reasons why campaigns may have little to no effect on the eventual 
outcome of the vote. A 1993 study by Gelman and King found that voters typically receive all 
the information they choose to remember from the media and elsewhere, making it redundant 
that they were also contacted with the same information by campaigns.173 Kalla and Broockman 
then argue that the decreasing share of cross-pressured voters also decreases the number or type 
of messages that can be shared to persuade voters,174 though it is unclear if this refers simply to a 
lack of options for specific campaign outreach or the media more completely disseminating that 
 
166 Joshua L. Kalla and David Broockman, “The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact in General 
Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments,” American Political Science Review 112, no. 1 (2018): 151. 
167 Ibid 148-149. 
168 Cross-pressured voters don’t “fit” well with their preferred party, either due to specific issue positions or aspects 
of one’s identity that are more commonly associated with an opposing party. 
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information which could be used to sway persuadable voters. Voters are exposed to both sides of 
competing arguments, and partisans have difficulty entertaining other ways of framing issues 
than the position of their preferred party. So as Kalla and Broockman note, “contact from 
campaigns in general elections could have effects early in the electoral cycle before the media 
provides competing frames and relevant information, but that these effects would decay 
rapidly.”175 Kalla and Broockman rule out the idea of “oversaturation” of information based on 
their field study being the only door-to-door contact received by most of their sample.176 
However, oversaturation is better expressed as coming from all forms of information, unless they 
have reason to believe door-to-door contact is received differently from political advertising, 
discourse with family and friends, and consumption of news and social media. 
 Of course, it can also be expected that candidates who raise more money will be more 
successful even if spending doesn’t create increased support. While political donors are only a 
small share of the electorate, support from donors suggests a level of popularity and “quality” 
that is often difficult to measure but may be the mark of a talented candidate. The measure of 
money received would not be as strong a measure of popularity as an aggregate total of 
individual donors, but the smaller size of unitemized contributions should keep candidates in the 
same ballpark. In addition, large donors who seek influence or access should be more likely to 
target candidates who are favored to win; chapter 2 showed that incumbents raise a larger share 
of their funds from large donors do than challengers. Based on this strategy, a healthy amount of 
large donations should suggest that a challenger has a strong chance of unseating an incumbent. 
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Another consideration for fundraising, spending, and campaign contact is the likelihood 
of diminishing marginal returns for that activity. Introducing a new ad, voter script, or other 
persuasive communication presents a new issue framing, thought, or piece of information that 
can sway a voter, but constantly repeating established ideas may be less effective than the initial 
establishment of that idea in the first place. Too many different ideas may be less effective than 
hammering home a straightforward message that undecided voters remember on Election Day, 
but the difference between running an ad 499 and 500 times is obviously less than the difference 
between running it once and twice. This can lead to the idea of a “magic number” for 
fundraising, after which additional dollars have a negative or neutral impact. Of course, Kalla 
and Broockman appear to argue that diminishing marginal returns is not an issue because the 
marginal returns are always close to zero, but this idea is worth exploring as a possibility. 
 Sara Gideon’s 2020 campaign for one of Maine’s Senate seats may be an example of 
additional dollars having a negative impact on the outcome. The New York Times quoted a voter 
calling the spending in the race “a slap in the face of America,” and the state head of Obama’s 
campaigns called it “out of control.” Bill Green, a registered Democrat, appeared in pro-Collins 
ads where he described “more than $40 million in false attacks against Susan Collins by out-of-
staters who don’t give a darn about Maine, and it’s shameful.”177 As that Obama campaign head 
states, “when you have that much money, you’re throwing stuff at the wall.”178 Gideon still 
ended the campaign with almost $15 million on hand.179 The content of Gideon’s campaign may 
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have mattered just as much as the overspending, but that sort of financial advantage does lend 
credence to allegations of attempting to “buy” an election. 
 On the other hand, financial strength has a demonstrated significance in primary 
elections. Adam Bonica found that doubling a candidate’s fundraising total led to a 45 percent 
increase in primary vote share, with both figures adjusted for the contest average.180 In addition, 
primary candidates who display financial strength gain the idea of “electability” through the idea 
that the many individuals or organizations backing them makes them more likely to defeat the 
opposing candidate in the general election. This concept extends down to the seed stage; Hacker 
and Pierson claim that candidates who fundraise well are supported by the DCCC or otherwise 
“shut…out,” a process also emphasized by Rahm Emmanuel claiming “the first third of your 
campaign is money, money, money.”181 The purpose of EMILY’s List, a PAC focused on female 
candidates who support abortion rights, reinforces this idea, since its name is an acronym for 
Early Money is Like Yeast (it makes the dough rise).182 Bonica has also argued that lawyers and 
doctors are overrepresented in Congress because “even the most compelling candidates will 
struggle to keep pace” if they don’t have a personal network that can provide them with an initial 
infusion of cash.183 This increase may be a benefit of being able to spend more and expand a 
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Modeling Candidate Success in General Elections 
 To analyze the relationship between fundraising and electoral success, I again leaned on 
Adam Bonica’s Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME). The DIME 
dataset is useful for its aggregation of candidate data, though I’ve added fundraising totals from 
the FEC (which were not updated for the end of 2018 in the most recent DIME totals) and 2016 
Presidential results by district from the Cook Political Report.184 DIME is most useful for its 
CFscores (CF stands for campaign finance), which provide ideology estimates for all candidates, 
not just former legislators, based on the donors who contribute to their campaigns.185 As is the 
case with DW-nominate scores, 0 is the “center,” so I use the absolute value of the scores to 
measure a candidate’s extremism. By a degree of necessity, I filter out candidates without 
CFscores, and when comparing candidates to opponents, remove those without one in the 
remainder of the data.186 I’ve also only included candidates who receive between 10 and 90 
percent of the votes in the general election.187 Party and cycle were included to attempt to control 
for year-to-year swings towards specific parties, in this case the 2018 “blue wave” for the 
Democrats (this analysis is limited to 2016 and 2018). 
 
184 For the latter, Bonica divides the most recent Democratic Presidential candidate’s vote share by the two-party 
vote share in that district, but I was only able to replicate some of the figures based on either 2012 or 2016 Cook 
data. Most figures were within 1% but slightly different, less than half were exactly the same.  
185 CFscores are based on clustering contributors, with DW-nominate scores as a foundational basis. Individual 
donors can be assigned ideology scores based on the known ideologies of candidates they donate to, then scores can 
be assigned for all candidates based on a weighted average of contributors. In addition to giving a score to 
candidates who do not have a record of roll call votes, CFscores are able to reflect candidate positions on issues that 
are not regularly voted on in Congress but come up frequently in campaigns, like abortion, same-sex marriage, or 
Medicare for All. 
186 About 400 candidates get removed (n=1151 vs. n=1585) when making adjustments for lack of an opponent in the 
data set, jungle primaries, or fundraising the vast majority (> 99%) of the money in the race. 





I model the relationship between a candidate’s spending advantage and electoral 
performance relative to their party’s presidential candidate in their district.188 I found that some 
candidates (i.e. Zak Ringelstein in the 2018 Maine Senate election) had abnormally low relative 
performances due to special factors like 3-way races or “jungle” primaries.189 As such, I restrict 
the data set to candidates who receive a vote share within 25 percentage points of the presidential 
margin. Table 3.1 shows the results from a model looking at House and Senate candidates in 












188 This helps control for the partisan preferences of voters going to the polls due to the makeup of the district. A 
House candidate who gets 40% of the vote when Hillary Clinton gets 30% of the two-party vote (and maybe 27% 
overall) is performing relatively better than a candidate who receives 60% in a district where Clinton gets 70%. 
189 Primaries in which several candidates from all parties face one another, or general elections that allow multiple 
candidates from the same party, can lead to two candidates from the same party facing off head-to-head, with both 




Table 1: The Effect of Itemized and Unitemized Contributions on Votes 

































Controls    














R2 .1027 .1085 .1261 
Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in 
parentheses. Dependent variable is vote share difference between a candidate and the share received by their party’s 
presidential candidate (in their district) in the 2016 election. 2016 and 2018 candidates only. 
*90% of CFscores range between -1.52 and 1.28. 
 
 The results suggest that electoral success is not particularly well-explained by ideology, 
fundraising, and gender (given the low R2). In the first model of Table 3.1 (with all candidates) 
there is a significant relationship between itemized contributions and electoral performance but 
all other fund-raising effects are insignificant. Incumbents who are more extreme receive fewer 
votes to the tune of -2.6% for 1 point in CFscore, which grows to a 4.5% difference in comparing 
the most moderate and most extreme candidates (0-1.8). We might expect more ideologically-
extreme candidates to be less popular with the median voter.190 Itemized contributions, 
meanwhile, should correlate well with electoral performance because of the desire for “access” 
that leads contributors to give to more-competitive candidates or those likely to win. Still, $1 
 




million in itemized contributions leads to only a 0.26% advantage over the 2016 presidential 
baseline.  
 The non-challenger models are also the first indication that voters prefer male candidates, 
though it is unclear why this bias would exist for incumbents but not challengers. Female 
incumbents raised more from small donations than similar male colleagues (shown in Chapter 2), 
and there may be an intricate relationship in which another cause of receiving those small 
donations also leads to lower electoral success. The idea that small donors prefer female 
candidates but male candidates do better electorally then implies that small donors are 
significantly different from the overall population in more than ideology, otherwise men would 
do comparably better with small donors or women with voters as a whole. 
 There are of course several flaws with using an aggregate measure of money raised, or 
even money spent, in this model. One major issue is that many districts (or states) are much more 
expensive to run in than others. Many districts lie in expensive media markets, some in multiple 
markets (though that is more of an issue in Senate races). The expense of contact with voters 
cannot be controlled for with district income since, for example, there are both extremely 
wealthy and fairly poor districts within the very-expensive New York City market, and 
candidates would potentially have less voter contact per dollar there than in Maine’s first district, 
which lies in the Portland media market. So aggregate spending or aggregate relative spending is 
a less effective measure than the percentage difference between opposing candidates’ fundraising 
or expenditures totals, though even that is susceptible to differences in how money is spent. 




fundamental understanding of how specific candidates are spending their money.191 Table 3.2 re-
estimates the models with fund-raising advantage, comparing them to their opponents. 
Table 2: Fund-Raising Advantage and Vote Share 
Variables All Candidates Incumbents Challengers 





















Controls    












R2 .1735 .1993 .1776 
Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in 
parentheses. Dependent variable is vote share difference between a candidate and the share received by their party’s 
presidential candidate (in their district) in the 2016 election. 
 
 Candidates with large spending advantages do extremely well relative to the party’s 2016 
presidential baseline. The effect of spending advantage is significant for both incumbents and 
challengers, and in the model of all candidates $1 million in extra spending leads to 0.53% of 
additional relative vote share. This is suggestive of a fairly, though not extremely, strong 
relationship between spending and success. It is important to recall that the average incumbent in 
2016 and 2018 spent $1.5 million, and had a spending advantage of about $200,000 over their 
opponent (from chapter 2). A million-dollar spending advantage is thus much larger than the 
 
191 As a corollary, heavy self-funding or support primarily by a handful of individuals or Super-PACs is not a sign of 




typical candidate’s, though for more-expensive races such advantages are not uncommon.192 
Findings for gender and for candidate extremism are similar to the earlier results. 
 Because this relationship models the difference between a candidate’s vote share and that 
of Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton in their district, races which are less competitive should not 
distort the results. Uncompetitive challengers may still be able to break the presidential baseline 
without significant financial backing, while incumbents may still fall short despite it. Further, 
donors concerned with “access” should not be concerned about funding those incumbents who 
are less popular, especially if they are in a hyper-partisan district that ensures their reelection 
anyway. But do candidates raise more money because they have more support, or do they have 
more support because they’ve raised and spent more money? If donors as a whole tend to be 
more ideologically extreme, and a candidate appeals primarily to the center, they will likely gain 
fewer donors than they might have otherwise, since donors appear more polarized than the 







192 If $20 million is raised, it takes raising 55% of the money to have a $1 million spending advantage; if $5 million 
is raised, it takes 60%. 
193 Raymond J. La Raja and Brian F. Schaffner, “The Ideological Wellsprings of Campaign Money,” In Campaign 




Table 3: Fund-Raising Advantage and Vote Share by Election Cycle, 2016-2018 
Variables 2016 Candidates 2018 Candidates 
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R2 .4167 .048 
Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in 
parentheses. Dependent variable is vote share difference between a candidate and the share received by their party’s 
presidential candidate (in their district) in the 2016 election. 
 
Analyzing 2016 results only (see Table 3.3), though, continues to demonstrate a strong 
connection between fundraising and success. Candidates who were more ideologically extreme 
were even less successful (compared to results in earlier tables) relative to the presidential 
baseline, and an even larger spending advantage was necessary to attain additional votes. The 
8.5-point advantage given to Republicans may at least be somewhat reflective of Donald Trump 
losing the popular vote even as Republican House members beat Democrats by 1% nationally. 
On the other hand, 2018 results do not demonstrate any sort of meaningful relationship for 
candidate ideology. With such a disconnect between the figures in the two years, it is clear that 
the circumstances of the two elections must be substantially different. 
Separating the data from 2016 and 2018 should also be more effective than controlling 
for cycle. Campaign cycles can be fundamentally different from one another, as more-
independent voters switching their backing and others choosing to show up or stay home hands 




single-cycle analyses, especially when candidates are being analyzed relative to their party’s 
performance in a prior election cycle. However, controlling for a linear relationship between 
campaign cycle/year and candidate performance fails to account for the interaction between party 
and cycle as those change. Table 3.2 suggests an average improvement of 3% for challengers in 
2018 over their 2016 counterparts,194 and a 2% decline for incumbents, which would indicate a 
more-turbulent cycle in 2018. In a sense, this does reflect the Democratic wave in 2018, as most 
losing incumbents were Republicans, and most winning challengers Democrats. 
Table 4: Including Incumbency as a Control: 
Variables 2016 Candidates 2018 Candidates 



















Controls   




R2 .4448 .0473 
Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in 
parentheses. Dependent variable is vote share difference between a candidate and the share received by their party’s 
presidential candidate (in their district) in the 2016 election. 
 
Table 3.4 adds incumbency as a control and shows an approximately 3% average “bump” 
for incumbent legislators over 2016 presidential performance, but no such advantage appears in 
the less-robust 2018 model. Controlling for incumbency also suggests spending an extra $1 
million in 2016 would lead to a slightly-lower 0.45 percentage-point gain in vote share than the 
 




0.74% in Table 3.3, a still-important figure, and lowers the maximum estimated effect from 
ideology to about 2.5%. Since incumbents do outraise their opponents, it makes sense that 
controlling for it would decrease the impact of spending; similarly, as incumbents are more 
moderate, it makes sense that some of incumbency advantage was baked into that figure. It is 
surprising, though, that incumbents experienced virtually no advantage in 2018 (as evidenced by 
the null effect in the right column of Table 3.4). 
The Most Competitive Races 
 In the most competitive races, we should expect donors interested in access to behave 
differently than in less-competitive races, where they can give to a candidate virtually assured of 
victory. Since competitive candidates have a reasonable chance of victory, we should also expect 
them to attempt to maximize their chances; the motivations and effort of less-competitive 
candidates may be more unclear. From this, we may expect contributions overall to better 
distinguish who is a quality candidate. However, the volume of media about these races may also 
minimize the effects of campaign spending itself, since voters will hear about the race much 
more than they would about one that is less competitive. These races are also more expensive, 
with the average candidate in 2016 spending $4,574,890 compared to $1,750,316 for all races.195 









Table 5: Fund-Raising and Vote Share in Competitive Races 
Variables 2016 Candidates 2016 Candidates 2018 Candidates 2018 Candidates 






































Controls     








R2 .2209 .2136 .081 .0659 
Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in 
parentheses. Dependent variable is vote share difference between a candidate and the share received by their party’s 
presidential candidate (in their district) in the 2016 election. Set of candidates who received between 45 and 55% of 
general election vote. 
 
Table 3.5 looks only at candidates who received between 45 and 55 percent of the general 
election vote. In these most-competitive races, candidate ideology has an even more profound 
effect on votes, with the difference between the most moderate and extreme incumbents 
amounting to about a 10% difference in vote share relative to the 2016 Presidential results. 
Fundraising advantage, meanwhile, was unrelated to votes in 2016 and was only significant in 
2018 at 0.17% per additional million raised. The direction for party finally reflected much of the 
shift between 2016 and 2018, meaning Republicans out-performed Trump in 2016 but lagged 





Table 6: Fund-Raising and Vote Share in Primaries 
Variables Primary Losers 









millions of $) 
-5.016 
(.000) 
Gender (male) 0.3986 
(.634) 
R2 .0186 
Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in 
parentheses. Dependent variable is candidate vote share (0-100) in the primary (but in practice that cannot be above 
50 if this includes only losers). 
 
 
Table 3.6 looks at primary losers. Modeling the effect of spending on primaries requires 
data on fundraising prior to the primary date, since primary winners will raise substantial sums 
afterwards in preparation for the general election. Unfortunately, the FEC only offers full reports 
on fundraising totals through the end of the election cycle, which I have used, though even 
quarterly reports would be ineffective if a candidate receives a fundraising windfall directly after 
a primary victory. Using fundraising through the end of the first quarter of the election year may 
be an effective replacement,196 but I was unable to find an aggregate set of this information. 
Without it, I have modeled how fundraising totals affect vote shares for primary losers, since 
their fundraising effectively ends with that loss. We should still expect a direct and predictable 
relationship between fundraising and success since partisan leanings of the electorate become 
less meaningful. However, having information on relative spending, overall expense in the race, 
 
196 Most primaries occur before the end of the second quarter, and candidates may see a fundraising bump 
immediately after winning a competitive primary, whether it is from existing supporters or undecideds who planned 




and candidate name recognition (primarily from experience in elected or appointed office) would 
help clarify the relationship and potentially establish a better predictive model. 
Greater precision can also be found by separating primary opponents of incumbents, and 
individuals competing to run for an open seat or against an incumbent of the opposing party. 
Incumbents should have a large fundraising advantage over their primary opponents, and may 
require a much larger fundraising total to overcome, cases like Brat vs. Cantor notwithstanding. 
In races without an incumbent, two candidates are on a more-level playing field and should be 
able to properly compete with much less in funding. However, the most accurate results will only 
come when also analyzing the winners of those primaries, with their fundraising totals through 
the date of that election. 
In Table 3.6, there is an opposing relationship between itemized and unitemized 
contributions, and a significant effect for CFscores, though the predictive measure of funding 
and ideology on vote share for primary losers is practically zero (in looking at the model’s R2). 
The negative effects of unitemized contributions should just lead to underperformance relative to 
a candidate, usually an incumbent, who receives more of their share in itemized contributions, 
but because those itemized contributions still substantially outnumber their small counterparts in 
any given election, the association between spending and vote share would be positive (and 
likely significant). However, given the already-established relationship between primary 
fundraising and electoral success as detailed by Bonica,197 we should expect a better predictive 
measure. 
 






 Sometimes money is just used to raise more money in a cycle that inflates totals but does 
not necessarily aim for, or result in, increasing the broader level of support for a candidate, 
particularly when a campaign’s most ardent supporters are both the most likely donors and voters 
for that candidate. For example, the Trump campaign spent nearly half of its $800 million in 
expenditures prior to September 2020 trying to raise more money,198 though it’s possible that this 
push did still have a small impact on undecided voters. Campaigns can also have different levels 
of administrative costs, whether from researching and determining strategy, spending on 
producing media, or simply operating more or less efficiently. The Lincoln Project, for example, 
while not a campaign, had spent only about $200,000 placing advertisements by the end of 
March 2020, but had spent almost the same amount producing those ads and sent almost $1 
million to a strategic communications firm run by the group’s treasurer.199 
 Spending on actual communications can also be more effective depending on the type of 
message, or the way in which that spending is spread (some voters can only be reached on 
certain platforms). Digital spending, such as advertising on Facebook, has become increasingly 
popular for campaigns, but not all candidates have been quick to move towards its use. While 
trying to argue that Democrats did not lose Congressional races due to attitudes about the 
Progressive movement, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez commented on Conor Lamb, an incumbent 
Representative from Pennsylvania who narrowly won reelection and who spent $2,000 on 
 
198 Shane Goldmacher and Maggie Haberman, “How Trump’s Billion-Dollar Campaign Lost Its Cash Advantage,” 
New York Times, September 7, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/07/us/politics/trump-election-campaign-
fundraising.html. 
199 Karl Evers-Hillstrom, “Lincoln Project Capitalizes on Trump’s Rage as Its Spending Comes Under Scrutiny,” 





Facebook the week before the election. She claimed “if you’re not spending $200,000 on 
Facebook with fund-raising, persuasion, volunteer recruitment, get-out-the vote the week before 
the election, you are not firing on all cylinders.”200 
Table 7: Facebook Spending, Fund-Raising Advantage, and Vote Share 
Variables All Candidates All Candidates 












Controls   

























R2 .0658 .0783 
Estimates from linear regression models. Entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with p-values in 
parentheses. Dependent variable is vote share difference between a candidate and the share received by their 
party’s presidential candidate (in their district) in the 2016 election. 
 
 If Facebook or digital spending is part of a more effective campaign strategy, we should 
expect to see a correlation between Facebook spending and candidate success against the 2016 
presidential baseline in a candidate’s district while controlling for fundraising or spending, since 
 
200 Astead W. Herndon, “Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez on Biden’s Win, House Losses, and What’s Next for the Left,” 





candidates who have more money will be able to spend more on all methods of reaching voters. 
Including data on Facebook spending from the last two weeks of the 2020 cycle and using it as a 
proxy for digital or campaign savvy in 2016 and 2018,201 I find a significant relationship between 
spending on Facebook and candidate success, with candidates receiving 3.8% more for every 
$100,000 or so in spending for those two weeks, a number that indicates a solid portion of 
success can be driven by strategy. Rather importantly, a candidate’s overall spending advantage 
becomes only slightly significant in this model. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 The effect of campaigns on electoral outcome is not clear, as media outreach and contact 
with voters often displays a bump in support that decreases over time, making the impact of the 
outreach eventually zero, but several studies have found small positive impacts on vote share 
from candidate spending more broadly. It remains possible that spending is correlated with 
success even if the effects of that spending are not, since more-popular candidates should 
perform better with donors. However, that fundraising may be a double-edged sword, as too 
much support, particularly if it comes from less-popular groups like the wealthy and out-of-
staters, can also open up that candidate to allegations that they and their supporters are 
attempting to “buy” the election – though that may actually have no final impact as well. 
 
201 The only included candidates are those who ran in 2020 and at least one of the prior two cycles, in addition to 
having listed Facebook spending. This is admittedly a weak test of strategy effects on outcomes. I was not able to 
look only at candidate Facebook spending in the 2018 election, and Facebook did not release this information for the 





 Analyzing fundraising and election performance for 2016 and 2018 candidates 
demonstrates a significant relationship between candidate spending and electoral performance. 
Candidates gain 0.53 percent more of the vote for every $1 million more they raise than their 
opponent, an advantage lower than incumbency or being an ideological moderate, but which 
could be significant at higher levels of spending. However, this advantage shrunk to just 0.17% 
in the most competitive races in 2018, and was insignificant in the most competitive races of 
2016, perhaps a good example of oversaturation of information for voters.  
Candidates who received more in itemized donations also performed better than those 
who received more in small donations, except in the most competitive races in 2018. While it is 
still difficult to dissociate whether spending fuels support or is a byproduct of it, candidates who 
spent more on Facebook advertising outperformed slightly more. It is difficult to believe that the 
millions of dollars candidates spend on federal campaigns have no impact, but minimal effects 
makes sense when voters are often bombarded with competing ideas. 
More ideologically-extreme candidates also perform somewhat or significantly worse 
than comparable, more-moderate candidates. The effect of 1 point in CFscore varies from about 
1% to 7% of vote share, implying that a candidate with the same score as Bill Nelson (CFscore -
0.75) would perform 1% better than a candidate with the same score as Bernie Sanders (CFscore 
-1.8). Importantly, the 7% effect is when only considering the closest races of 2016, implying 
voters were much more willing to support more-moderate candidates and potentially cross party 
lines to do so. The decrease of this effect in 2018 to about -3.5 (still looking at the closest races) 
implies stronger partisanship, or a willingness to support candidates who may be less moderate. 
 If spending is mostly irrelevant in what candidate wins a general election, particularly 




supporting more ideologically-extreme candidates perhaps should be focused on primary 
elections, where spending might matter more and the “penalties” for extremism may be lower, or 
reversed. Primaries are the only election that matters in many districts, so better understanding 
the relationship between small donations, ideology, and electoral results in primaries is crucial to 
anticipating the effects of public matching or furthered attempts to tap into this expanding donor 
pool. As it stands, implementing voucher programs or other ways of encouraging new and less-
partisan donors to engage in the finance process would be a “safer bet,” but unless recipients are 
involved in that primary process, it appears a possibility that public funding will not make much 
of a difference. 
 The final, concluding chapter of this paper will discuss the implications of the findings of 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 on potential solutions to the problem of “big money” in politics. The 
correlation between receiving more in small donations and having a more-extreme CFscore, and 
the relationship between fundraising and success, suggests that these more-extreme candidates 





Chapter 4: Considering Campaign Finance Reforms (and Conclusion) 
 To some extent, the preceding chapters of this paper presuppose a problem with “big 
money” in politics, particularly the overrepresentation of wealthy donors in the funding of 
political campaigns. This overrepresentation is irrefutable from a purely monetary perspective, 
and these concerns are not unfounded. In 2016, 15,810 individuals, less than 0.0001% of the 
American population, accounted for half of all political contributions,202 an amount totaling 
several billion dollars.203 Furthermore, former Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey has wondered “is 
Americans for Prosperity going to advertise against me in a primary, yes or no?”204 Joe 
Scarborough explicitly states that from his experience in Congress, “across the spectrum, money 
changed votes,”205 while Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut states “you’re hearing a lot about 
problems that bankers have and not a lot of problems that people who work in the mill in 
Thomaston, Conn. have.”206 Yet Stephen Ansolabehere, John De Figueiredo, and James Snyder, 
in their paper, “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?” documented how most studies 
on PAC contributions found insignificant or negative connections between contributions from 
interest groups and support (votes) for an issue.207 
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204 Richard Hasen, Plutocrats United: Campaign Money, the Supreme Court, and the Distortion of American 
Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016): 51-52. 
205 Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost. (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2015): 133. 
206 Gareth Fowler and Daniel I. Weiner, “Understanding H.R. 1’s Public Financing Provisions,” Brennan Center for 
Justice (September 20, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Understanding%20HR1%20Public%20Financing.pdf: 3. 
207 Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. De Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder, “Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. 




However, “clean elections” may be more important as a perspective than as a reality,208 
and the perception is that our politicians are beholden to the people who give them money. A 
post-Citizens United poll found that over 70 percent of respondents “agreed” that representatives 
were “controlled” by the principal funders of their campaigns.209 The Brennan Center for Justice 
argues that “the reality, or even the perception, that campaign donors call the shots on major 
policy decisions is deeply corrosive to our democracy.”210 The increased role of small donations, 
and proposed public financing programs, whether grants, vouchers, tax rebates, or public 
matching, may help lessen the perspective that members of Congress care primarily about large 
donors, and could help candidates with less access to these same wealthy donors win elections. 
 Of course, it’s not clear that by increasing the role of small donations, politicians will act 
more independently or be less considerate of larger donations. When he was in the Senate, 
Kerrey probably would have considered Americans for Prosperity’s perspective to avoid their 
support of an opponent. Relying on small donations may be a riskier proposition for current 
incumbents trained in one primary method of fundraising. In addition, public matching programs 
that force participating candidates to accept lower limits on individual contributions are unable to 
prevent outside spending, in which case candidates may try to simultaneously court small donors 
and the backing of Super PACs and 501(c)4 “dark money”211 group. 
 It is also important to consider that large donations do not necessarily have a major 
impact on the outcome of elections. In chapter 3, I found that candidates who received $1 million 
more than their opponent would beat Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump’s share of the two-party 
 
208 As the wide Republican perception of actually-nonexistent “voter fraud,” perpetuated by politicians, makes 
abundantly clear, it does not matter if elections are fair if you can convince a share of the public otherwise.  
209 Lessig, Republic, Lost, 167. 
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vote by 0.53 percent, and that large donations generally correlated with better performance and 
small donations with worse performance, but the impact of fundraising became insignificant 
when considering elections decided by less than 10 percent of the vote. Money may still be 
useful in primaries, but I was unable to provide a detailed analysis in that chapter. Additional 
small donations and money from public programs like vouchers will also not help in the most-
important fundraising period of primaries, the seed round. According to Adam Bonica, lawyers 
and doctors are so well-represented in Congress because of their success in this round of 
fundraising, where they tap their personal network of high-salaried friends and colleagues.212 
EMILY’s List, meanwhile, equates early money with “yeast” since “it makes the dough rise.”213 
 
Solutions to the Perception or Problems of “Big Money” in Politics 
 The most obvious solution to “big money” in politics, regulating it, is much more 
difficult with the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the right to freedom of speech and its definition 
of corruption as cash directly resulting in votes. Buckley v. Valeo established an inability to 
“suppress communications” through “ceilings on expenditures” except for the goal of preventing 
“quid pro quo” corruption.214 Citizens United later limited that definition of “quid pro quo” 
corruption to “dollars for political favors,” adding that “the appearance of influence or access, 
furthermore, will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy.”215 As long as the 
expectation is that political favors are not encouraged by unlimited outside spending, or by the 
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current limits on direct contributions to candidates, it seems likely that specific restrictions on 
large spenders will get struck down as too restrictive on speech. 
 However, there may be greater benefit in fighting spending with more spending, rather 
than trying to establish a set of restrictions that may be too onerous on issue advocates or too 
permissive towards those who attempt to skirt the rules. The focus should be on outside 
spending, as individuals prevented from giving more to specific campaigns may be able to give 
to PACs or interest groups like the NRA instead. Even if the government was able to instill 
somewhat-low limits on outside spending, individuals and organizations like the NRA would 
still deserve and possess the right to advertise and advocate for or against legislative action in 
print, on television, or online.  
In a polarized society, the line between a political advertisement and an issue 
advertisement can often be blurred. Ads telling viewers or readers to “call you representative,” or 
a specific Senator, and “tell them you support protecting the Second Amendment” may not state 
that they should support or vote for a Republican candidate, but the delineation between the two 
parties on gun rights makes the implication clear.  
There is also the issue of where to “draw the line” on explicit political spending: A full 
page ad in the Sunday New York Times costs $245,000216 while a large stack of posters and 
hanging materials might cost a few hundred dollars or even less; is the latter more permissible 
simply because fewer people will be reached by the communication? And how is printing posters 
different from receiving and putting up a yard sign? In a situation where cost and reach are not 
always directly correlated, drawing a specific line anywhere makes no sense. 
 




Small donors may be the existing “solution” to this problem. 22% of contributions made 
by the end of September in the 2020 election cycle came from small donations, up from 15% in 
2016,217 suggesting that they could become more viable as a primary source of funding for 
campaigns. Public matching programs, in which a candidate typically agrees to a lower 
maximum contribution size in return for receiving public funding at a proportional rate, often $6 
for every $1, for small donations received, would put this current method of funding campaigns 
on steroids. 6:1 public matching may also incentivize more individuals to contribute to 
candidates, but unless it is widely advertised a mix of lack of information and the original costs 
of contributing218 may also prevent that expansion of the donor base. I did not establish that 
candidates who would opt into such a matching program would be more ideologically extreme, 
but Chapter 2 established that candidates who receive a higher share of small donations are more 
ideologically extreme and those candidates would be the greatest potential beneficiaries of such a 
program. These ideologically-extreme candidates would not be representative of the broader 
population as a whole, which is bell-shaped rather than bimodal.219 
Vouchers are another public financing proposal, but one that would primarily rely on 
increasing the number of donors. There are two different methods of achieving this type of 
program: The first, vouchers themselves, has been championed by authors like Lawrence Lessig 
and Richard Hasen, and often gets a cute name like “democracy dollars.” Vouchers have been 
included in H.R. 1 as a pilot program in three to-be-determined states, though at the level of $25 
 
217 “2020 election to cost $14 billion, blowing away spending records,” OpenSecrets.org. 
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per recipient220 rather than Lessig and Hasen’s proposals of $50 or $100.221 The second, a tax 
rebate, has been proposed by the conservative Richard Painter. There are benefits and downsides 
to each variation as well. A voucher system will be more complicated for government agencies 
and for campaigns, while tax rebates are more complicated for individuals (many of whom may 
not be told that such a rebate exists). Giving individuals money in the present, rather than telling 
them they’ll be recompensated in the future, may also provide a greater incentive to actually 
contribute. 
Table 1: Preferences for Public Campaign Financing Proposals 
Each cell includes the mean and response breakdown; 1 means “strongly agree” and 7 means “strongly disagree.” 
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Vouchers are also less popular than other public financing proposals. Table 1 shows 
selected responses from a national survey by the Wesleyan Media Project, shared with the 
permission of Michael Franz. Respondents in the sample were from an online panel, but 
weighted to reflect census data. As part of the survey, they were asked to score various public 
finance proposals on a 7-point scale, where a 1 is “strongly agree” and a 7 is “strongly disagree.” 
Those respondents scored a tax rebate proposal at a 3.734, while vouchers scored a 4.251. Small 
donor matching actually performed worse than the voucher system with a score of 4.328, rising 
to a 4.633 when primed with “using taxpayer dollars.” The survey does demonstrate that the 
framing of any proposal is crucial. Matching funds score a more-neutral 4.039 when respondents 
were told that public matching would be funded with penalties from people convicted of tax 
fraud, and the difference between scores when taxpayer dollars are mentioned for question pair 
A and B and for question pair H and I, like the difference between L and N, is about 0.3. Voters 
may also be more supportive if they understood the magnitude of the program: If 200 million 
Americans each spent $25 in public funds, that would only cost the government $5 billion, and 
would actually still be substantially less than the amount spent by private actors on the 2020 
elections.222 Of course, $200 would be another story in terms of potential public investment in 
the electoral process. 
Voters also respond well to the idea of “levelling the playing field” between incumbents 
and challengers, a sign that presenting the purpose of specific legislation may improve its 
popularity, and that voters may view incumbents as having an unfair advantage in fundraising for 
their campaigns. “A public funding system for our elections is a good way to level the playing 
field between incumbents and challengers” scored a 3.512, including a 2.73 from Democrats. 
 




Voters who identified as Democratic on a 3-point party ID scale were more likely to support 
every public financing proposal, though the sample size of the responses was particularly small 
for Republicans. The most damaging sign for the prospects of a “democracy dollar” voucher 
program is that it was the only proposal for which Democratic-identifying respondents leaned 
more towards opposition than support. 
Conclusion 
 There are two equally compelling but opposing possible views of small donors and small 
contributions in federal elections. Small donations are accessible to a large portion of Americans; 
we spent almost as much on potato chips as was spent on federal campaigns in 2012, a 
Presidential cycle223 (and federal elections are only every other year!). 12 percent of respondents 
in the 2016 American National Election Survey claimed they donated to a political candidate that 
cycle,224 a surprisingly high number when only 1.6 million Americans contributed more than 
$200 to federal campaigns that cycle.225 The campaign finance system is much more than the 
15,810 donors who provided half of that cycle’s campaign funds,226 and the federal government 
has the ability to adopt programs that would encourage more Americans to participate or “level 
the playing field” between those who do. When a tiny fraction of the population funds a 
significant portion of American elections, and the threat or promise of that money affects the 
behavior or actions of politicians, it is more difficult to envision the “government of the people” 
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described by Abraham Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address, and which is the essential translation 
of the word “democracy.” 
 On the other hand, the “everyday” Americans who contribute to campaigns but are not 
part of the elite circle may not be that representative of the actual “Everyman.” Voters 
themselves actually follow a bell curve in terms of ideology, but the distribution of political 
contributors by ideology is bimodal, with more-partisan (or ideologically extreme) individuals 
more likely to donate,227 especially if they have more-extreme perspectives of the opposing 
party, though they often contribute in light of two-party competition rather than strictly 
individual preferences.228 Meanwhile, most of the 30 wealthiest Americans are closer to the 
center than either the Republican or the Democratic Parties,229 so their contributions may better 
reflect “everyday” Americans than the typical small donor.230 To some extent, we are left with a 
catch-22: Celebrating and encouraging the increasing role of small donations in federal elections 
takes power away from unrepresentative individuals in terms of wealth and power, and pushes it 
towards a group that is unrepresentative in terms of ideology. There are two massive paradigm 
shifts in campaign finance that could occur from an increased emphasis on small donations, and 
one centered around this existing donor population is likely to strengthen partisan divides and 
threaten more-moderate incumbents in primary challenges. 
  For the American campaign finance system to truly be more representative of its voting 
population, it does not simply need smaller donors to equal or surpass the power of the most 
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influential contributors, it needs more donors (who would likely be small donors) who reflect the 
actual voter population. Moderate donors could oppose extremist candidates in both primaries 
and general elections, even when they are registered independents, and finance programs that 
target this largely untapped population, especially if they are paired with other democratizing 
reforms, are an important step in ensuring the voice of every American is not just heard at the 
ballot box, but in the bank accounts of campaigns as well. Elections aren’t won simply because 
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